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Abstract  
The issue of security is still an aspect of concern for domestic and international 
politics. In Southeast Asia, in 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
agreed to establish three pillars for the future single community by 2015: the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). To live at peace with one another and with 
the world in democratic and harmonious environment, Southeast Asian Nations must take 
the APSC as a crucial mechanism to construct the field of political and security 
cooperation. The APSC should be promoted and analyzed in order to reach the 
establishment of peaceful regional security and the administration of regional security 
context. Meanwhile, there are many cases to tackle. Especially, focusing on this thesis is 
the interregional maritime territorial issue between China and ASEAN members – 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia – over disputed islands, namely the Spratly 
Islands conflict. Therefore, this thesis endeavors to investigate and study the security 
context of the Southeast Asian region through ASEAN action such as community 
integration by focusing especially on the Spratly Islands dispute case for a better 
understanding of Southeast Asian regional security. The Spratly Islands conflict has 
become a major concern for ASEAN due to its significances, the rise of China and the 
involvement of the United States. The islands are very important not only for ASEAN and 
China, but also for the United States as a superpower confined by the Regional Security 
Complex Theory (RSCT). Furthermore, this thesis will employ the RSCT to frame the 
research in order to implement research on the processes leading to the Southeast Asian 
securitization, conflict management, and establishing strong security cooperation (rather 
than on finding a resolution for the conflict) focusing on the regional, interregional, and 
global levels. As a result, ASEAN has promoted the Spratly Islands dispute as the 
desecuritization of the region via an international stage such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) with the intention of creating 
amity between relevant countries in the region.  
Keywords: ASEAN, ASEAN Way, The ARF, Regional Security Complex, Securitization  
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Southeast Asian Security Complex: The Case of the Spratly Islands Conflict 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The issue of security is still an aspect of concern for domestic and international 
politics. In Southeast Asia, in 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) agreed to establish three pillars for the future single community in 2015: the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Today, the public has 
realized that ASEAN seems to promote the AEC aspect more than the APSC and ASCC. 
However, it is essential for ASEAN to promote not only the AEC but also the other two 
pillars, especially the APSC, in order to establish peaceful regional security and 
administer the regional security context along with powerful countries like China and the 
United States in terms of the military’s modernized and territorial claims.  
 According to the future plan of ASEAN, there are many cases to tackle for 
example, domestic problems between the nation state members like Thailand and 
Cambodia, and the interregional maritime territorial issues between China and ASEAN 
members – Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia – over disputed islands, 
namely the Spratly Islands. To resolve the problems, ASEAN usually employs the 
ASEAN Way of implementing dispute resolution within the region. Furthermore, 
ASEAN hosts interregional (Asia-Pacific) conferences under the name of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) as the stage for security negotiations. It is very interesting to see 
how ASEAN reacts to the cases and what factors force the community to react.  
 Moreover, the Southeast Asian region has a lot of natural resources and is one of 
the world’s most important maritime trade routes and an area with a significant number 
of long-standing territorial disputes, particularly over the Spratly Islands in the South 
China Sea. In recent years the geopolitical balance in the region has not only been 
shifting, primarily in response to the rise in the economy and military of China (China’s 
National Defense, 2008 & 2013), but is also the result of the United States’ interest in 
balancing power within the Asia-Pacific region as the Obama administration’s pivot to 
Asia (White House, 2013). Meanwhile, relations between Southeast Asian countries and 
China have been increasingly positive, especially in economic terms; however, there has 
 7 
 
been an anxiety within the Southeast Asian region over China’s actions in the region, 
particularly the sovereignty claim over the South China Sea, where the Spratly Islands are 
located, which China considers to be of real interest to their country. Consequently, 
Southeast Asian countries (most of them) have sought to strengthen themselves, find 
resolution at the international stage, and reinforce relations with the United States in 
order to balance the rising power of China within the region and to securitize the 
Southeast Asian region (Taylor, 2011). 
 Therefore, this thesis endeavors to thoroughly investigate and study the security 
context of the Southeast Asian region through ASEAN action such as community 
integration by focusing especially on the Spratly Islands dispute in the South China Sea 
for a better understanding of Southeast Asian regional security. The Spratly Islands 
conflict has become a major concern for ASEAN due to its significance, the rise of China 
and its foreign policy. China has claimed its sovereign power over almost all-maritime 
territory of the archipelagos in the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands. The 
islands are very important not only for ASEAN and China, but also for the United States 
as a superpower confined by the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan & 
Waever, 2003). Therefore, this research will try to understand the responses of ASEAN 
to the Spratly Islands conflict. By doing so, this thesis will employ the RSCT to frame the 
research. The RSCT consists of four focusing levels as: domestic, regional, interregional, 
and global; however, this thesis will focus on regional, interregional, and global aspects 
in order to avoid being a too broadly focused topic. In the case of the regional issue, the 
thesis will study the approaches and the decision-making conditions of ASEAN. While 
regarding the interregional issue, the thesis will explore the action ASEAN takes in order 
to proceed in the security context concerning the Spratly Islands and how ASEAN reacts 
to the rise of China in its policy and military modernization. Furthermore, a new strategy 
of the United States, which has turned to focus on the Southeast Asian region as a stage 
for balancing power with China (the new challenging superpower), will be analyzed. 
 1.1 THE SPRATLY ISLANDS CONFLICT   
 The Spratly Islands are situated in the southern part of the South China Sea and 
comprise a collection of over 230 shoals, reefs, and small islets that are spread over 
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roughly a 150,000 square mile area. Geographically, the islands lie 120 miles west of the 
Philippine island of Palawan, 150 miles northwest of the Malaysian State of Sabah, 230 
miles east of the Vietnamese coast and 900 miles south of China’s Hainan Island. The 
various claims to the Spratly Islands are very complicated. The reasons for the claims can 
be divided into three groups of claimants. The first group consists of China, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam claiming for historical background reasons. The second group, the Philippines, 
claims for the right of discovery. Malaysia and Brunei are in the last group associated 
with the continental shelves and the Law of the Sea Convention. The conflicting and 
overlapping boundaries are complicated by various entitlement intentions. China, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam argue for the entitlement of the entire Spratly Islands area. The 
Philippines argues for 60 islets, rocks, and atolls called Kalayaan (Freedom land). On the 
other hand, Malaysia maintains three islands and four groups of rock at the southern 
boundary of the Spratly Islands while Brunei demands a single reef from the area (Coker, 
1996). 
Furthermore, the Spratly Islands are located on both sides of the sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs), which are significant commercial routes for the region and the 
world. These sea lines link the Pacific and the Indian Oceans via the Malacca Strait, 
which provides maritime traffic proceeding to Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Indochina 
and the West Pacific. The other great powers, other than China, that need to use these sea 
lines for significant sea import of oil and goods through this area are Japan and South 
Korea, as well as the United States in accordance with the strategy for accessing a route 
for the United States’ fleet between the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Wurfel & Burton, 
1996). Moreover, the greatest economic aspect in this area is the potential for natural 
resources, namely oil and gas. According to geologists’ estimation, the Spratly Islands 
territory may have a billion tons of oil and gas, which are significant for supporting 
economic and military growth in the future (Collins, 2003). So a nation with sovereign 
control over the Spratly Islands territory would have power and a commanding position 
to influence trade (to the rest of the world) and geopolitical strategy throughout this 
region. 
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1.2 OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
Therefore, this research endeavors to investigate in depth the Southeast Asian 
security dynamic, conflict management and security complex approach to the Spratly 
Islands dispute. It will focus on the matter of securitization and desecuritization of the 
region under the ASEAN framework. The Spratly Islands conflict will be used as the 
indicator to illustrate Southeast Asian security development. With regard to the ASEAN 
intention in 2003 to be a single community by 2015, the security aspect of the Southeast 
Asian region should be revisited since the policy decision factors will be changed, 
whereas the securitization in the region is fluctuating all the time regarding the nature of 
the Regional Security Complex. In addition, it is possible to state that the dispute is 
difficult and too complex to be solved by applying only one approach among the parties. 
The commitment of ASEAN has seen some limitations and ambiguity behind it as it 
involves the territory, the maritime zone and the essential resources assumed to exist in 
the South China Sea. The content of this research will express the framework that 
ASEAN tries to provide solutions for the Spratly Island dispute, especially on security 
cooperation issues such as code of conduct, multilateral conflict resolutions, and other 
joint development cooperation over the existing resources. Then it will generalize the 
impact of China on the ASEAN security approach, which leads to internal and external 
problems in the region.  
Outlined in the background mentioned above, this thesis endeavors to answer the 
following research questions: 
1) How did the Southeast Asian region become securitized or desecuritized in the 
period from 2003 until now? 
From this question, two sub-questions emerged:  
1) How is this (de-)securitization reflected in the Spratly Islands conflict and its 
management? 
2) What role has the Spratly Islands conflict played in the emergence of the 
Southeast Asian security complex? 
This thesis is structured as follows. After this introductory chapter, the second 
chapter will outline and discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis in terms of 
applicability and relevance. This thesis employs the Regional Security Complex Theory 
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(RSCT), which complements the scope of the Southeast Asian security complex 
concerning the Spratly Islands conflict. The third chapter deals with the methodological 
approach to the study. This thesis employs a case study method that relates and supports 
the RSCT as defined in the theoretical part as the RSCT works as a descriptive 
framework for area studies such as, in this thesis, the Spratly Islands conflict. The Spratly 
Islands conflict case will focus on the relevance of the securitization of the Southeast 
Asian region, the rise of China, and the involvement of the United States as the global 
actor. This is followed by an empirical study of securitization in the emergence of the 
Southeast Asian security complex as shown in the fourth chapter as the application to the 
case. The thesis will analyze the significance of the Spratly Islands, ASEAN approaches, 
China’s aggressiveness, and the United States involvement, respectively. In the final 
chapter, the thesis will conclude with my findings as well as suggest possible further 
research on the security context in the Southeast Asian region. 
2. THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY 
 The thesis has applied the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to analyze 
the security (complex) context in the Southeast Asian region through the Spratly Islands 
dispute. The factors shaping the Southeast Asia security context, the ASEAN security 
integration, and the current status of the dispute will be explored. Buzan and Waever 
(2003) developed a theory in their work Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security. Security complex, coined by Buzan and Waever (2003), refers to 
a region where the interdependence between the states is sufficiently intense so that their 
national security concerns cannot be analyzed or resolved separately from others within 
the region. The development of the RSCT has focused not only on traditional security 
matters, known as the political-military sector, but also on security concerns and the 
international sector. The other contents of insecurity terms beyond a military context 
consist of economics, environment, natural resources, and so on (Buzan & Waever, 
2003).  
The RSCT offers a new concept of security as “…an issue, which is posited (by a 
securitizing actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the 
liberal internal economic order, the rainforests) that is claimed to have a right to survive. 
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Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be 
too late to act, it is not defensible to leave the issue to normal politics” (Buzan & Waever, 
2003, p.71). This concept of security focuses on the perception of security threats over 
whether to act or not so that further definitions are provided as securitization (and/or 
desecuritzation). The process of securitization / desecruitization, according to the RSCT, 
can be illustrated through the international system by making themselves apparent in 
regional clusters (Buzan & Waever, 2003). The definition used for securitization and for 
the purpose of this thesis draws on the RSCT definition as: 
the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is 
constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential 
threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for an urgent and exceptional 
measures to deal with the threat (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p.491).  
This means that the process by which a threat is treated is done so equally by all involved 
and is of mutual concern and requires some action. The mutual concern requires all actors 
to view the issue as dangerous to the referent object, which is mutually defined by the 
same object by the region security complex actor. On the other hand, desecuritization is 
defined as “the discursive process by which a political community downgrades or ceases 
to treat something as a threat” (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p.489). As Buzan and Waever 
(2003) explain, it is an issue that can be dealt within an ordinary political framework and 
can be worked through by coming to a peaceful multi-lateral agreement such as the 
ASEAN security framework concerning the Spratly Islands.  According to Buzan and 
Waever the process of such peaceful agreements “is reinforced by the promotion of 
norms regarding peaceful settlement of disputes, regular multilateral dialogue at several 
levels, and adherence to some international arms control agreements such as those on 
unclear non-proliferation” (2003, p.160). 
In this thesis, although the process that deals with security threats differs with regards to 
securitization and desecuritization. However, in both cases the referent object is seen as 
the significance of the Spratly Islands and the sovereignty over the area. The actors are 
the ASEAN member countries and the security threat is the China aggressiveness.  
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The concept of regional security complex covers how security is integrated in a 
region shaped by geography. Threats are likely to travel a short distance and may occur in 
the region. The security of each actor interacts with the security of the others within a 
region as security interdependence. The regional security complex is defined by durable 
patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent 
patterns of security interdependence. The formation of the regional security complex 
derives from the interplay between the anarchic structure and its balance of power 
consequences, and on the other hand the pressures of local geographical proximity 
(Buzan & Waever, 2003). With regard to the regional security complex, actors within a 
security complex have closer relations, whether friendly or antagonistic, with one another 
than they do with actors outside the complex.  
The theory behind the concept of regional security complex is the RSCT, which 
evolves the contemporary security terms and identifies emerging security threats. Within 
the theory, the regional actors socially construct the regional security complex because 
they are the ones defining the problem in such terms and interacting to produce a regional 
formation over the issue. With regard to ASEAN, this community is viewed as a loose 
cooperation (unstructured community cooperation), economic developing region defined 
by political instability. Mutual interest, economic cooperation, sovereignty over its 
territory, and the rise of China (in terms of China’s aggressiveness) may be new security 
terms that have driven ASEAN to a cooperative pursuit of regional security. These 
factors will lead to the settlement of the ASEAN security dynamics. It will decide the 
desecuritzation as developing the promotion of norms regarding peaceful settlement of 
disputes; it is the process that moves the referent, that is, the significance of the Spratly 
Islands and the sovereignty over the area, and the conflict, the Spratly Island conflict into 
the political sphere and (maybe) removes security from deliberation. In contrast, 
according Buzan and Waever (2003) these factors may cause ASEAN to securitize 
mutually to concerning threats and lead to an inflammatory situation rather than settling a 
conflict and developing a co-operation. This securitization process is not a normative 
goal as claiming a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules for reasons of 
security is not an ideal result for a conflict resolution (Buzan & Waever, 2003).  
As Buzan and Waever (2003) point out, the regional security complex is a set of 
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units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked 
that their security problems cannot be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. Its 
units normally generate the formative dynamics and structure of a security complex, due 
to the fact that the threats travel short distances in a shorter time. However, they may 
arise from collective securitizations of outside pressures as well. Thus, the standard form 
of the regional security complex is a pattern of rivalry, balance of power, and alliance 
among states within the region; to this pattern can then be added the effects of penetrating 
external power (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p.47). 
Moreover, the established function for the RSCT can be seen from four levels – 
domestic, regional, interregional, and global (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p.51) – while using 
the structure at a regional level to both access significant change and to identify the most 
likely pattern of evolution. The theory also offers the possibility of systematically linking 
the study of internal conditions, the relation among units in the region, the relation among 
regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers. Thus, the 
overall structure of the RSCT embodies four variables: boundary (which differentiates 
the RSC from its neighbors), anarchic structure (which means that the RSC must be 
composed of two or more autonomous units), polarity (which covers the distribution of 
power among the units), and social construct (which covers the patterns of amity and 
enmity among the units) (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p.53). 
 The RSCT is a significant tool for providing valuable insight into the 
understanding of the Southeast Asian regional security environment and the development 
of its security framework by exploration at the regional, interregional, and global level, 
respectively.  The creation and survival of ASEAN are useful for the transformation of 
the region’s essential structure and responsible for the confrontation of the post-Cold War 
era. The transformation of Southeast Asian security from conflict formation to security 
regime has moved the region forward from its shadowy past to a new creation of a 
distinct and autonomous region with relative control over its own boundary, polarity, 
structure, and social construction. Moreover, the Spratly Islands conflict and the rise of 
China have linked the Southeast Asian security concerns sufficiently closely together and 
highlighted the extent to which stability and security cannot be achieved without strong 
cooperation. The increasing threat posed by nontraditional and transnational security 
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issues has ensured that the intensity of the Southeast Asian (regional) security complex 
continues to deepen and a regional cooperation level remains an imperative feature of the 
regional security environment. 
 The domestic region’s relations and patterns of amity within Southeast Asia 
provide its regional peace. Nevertheless, the region is still comprised of individual and 
self-interested states who have accepted the need for economic and security cooperation 
in the pursuit of their own survival. ASEAN continues to face criticism over its 
functional autonomy of its units. The ASEAN style of conflict management, the ASEAN 
Way, has achieved the proposed initiatives, created the source of criticism; raised 
questions about ASEAN reliance on unbinding consensus based on decision-making and 
led external regions to penetrate in the region. However, the intertwined security 
interdependence and the strategies to cope with it are much more complicated than they 
appear. Proximity and familiarity can draw regions together, on the other hand historical 
and cultural aspects can pull them apart. 
My thesis aims to thoroughly investigate the evolution of the Southeast Asian 
security dynamic, conflict management, and the security complex approach concerning in 
particular the Spratly Islands dispute. This study is also an exploration and evaluation of 
the Southeast Asian security complex on the Spratly Islands dispute. Furthermore, the 
thesis will examine a number of actions (securitization and/or security cooperation in the 
region) focusing on levels such as the regional, interregional, and global level (which 
interlink with each other). The Spratly Islands conflict will be used as an indicator to 
illustrate Southeast Asian security development. Regarding the ASEAN intention in 2003 
to be a single community by 2015, the security aspect of the Southeast Asian region 
should be revised since the policy factors will be changed and securitization in the region 
is fluctuating all the time as the nature of the Regional Security Complex.  
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3. METHODOLOGY  
My research question is How did the Southeast Asian region become securitized 
or desecuritized in the period from 2003 until now?, which is relevant to the case study 
method. When it comes to using a case study method, it can be determined from the 
research question what a study is trying to address. Thus, I employed the case study 
method for my study. Meanwhile, this condition correlates with the Regional Security 
Complex Theory (RSCT) defined by Buzan and Waever (2003) that the RSCT works as a 
descriptive framework for area studies such as, in this thesis, the Spratly Islands conflict 
and the emergence of the Southeast Asian security complex (Buzan & Waever, 2003, 
p.42). 
This research was based on the case study of the Spratly Islands Conflict, and 
mostly used a qualitative research method (data collection). The data and relevant 
information, including articles, were utilized to foster the analytical method for 
understanding and analyzing the Southeast Asian security complex concerning the 
Spratly Islands dispute. The information in this research was mostly from primary 
sources: literatures and official documents. By analyzing the data from various sources 
such as the APSC blueprint, the meeting reports of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), an 
understanding of the implementation process of the ASEAN security community would 
encourage the outcome of this thesis to be a fruitful one. Moreover, China’s official 
documents and the United States’ point of view were illustrated in order to complete the 
research. Secondary sources – the Internet, the official website, updated articles, news, 
reports including relevant research papers and studies on this issue –also be studied. 
The sources mentioned above are vital as evidence because not only is it the 
narrative way of presenting a case study, but it is also the logic and chronology of my 
investigation in which the reasoning can be included. In addition, this thesis tried to use a 
more overtly narrative format in order to recreate the context and sequence of evidence so 
that the reader can understand the meaning of what the study would like to convey. 
Additionally, the data can produce be a good story and needs to be presented well. 
However, at each key point in the narrative, evidence needs to be presented for the 
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development and direction of the narrative. This must be much more than 
impressionistic: impressions and assertions must be substantiated in some way (Gillham, 
2000). 
Moreover, the qualitative methods enabled this thesis to carry out an in-depth 
investigation about the Southeast Asian security complex where little is known about 
what is going on in terms of its security aspect. This thesis explored the complexities of 
security beyond the Spratly Islands, China’s aggressiveness, the United States’ 
perspective and the Southeast Asian region. The method also enabled the study to gain a 
deeper understanding of Southeast Asia, ASEAN, and other security cooperation actors 
since the real information can only be perceived from the inside. The inside information 
can be derived from the perspective of those involved in inspection as viewing the case 
from the inside out. Regarding the thesis objective, this thesis explored the Southeast 
Asian security complex by using the RSCT in order to implement research on the 
processes leading to securitization, dealing with the conflict, and establishing strong 
security cooperation (rather than on finding a resolution for the conflict) focusing on the 
regional, interregional, and global levels (involvement of the United States and China). 
Due to the fact that this research could not conduct further data collection in 
Southeast Asia or the Spratly Islands, the secondary data was mainly used for the study. 
As for this thesis, to focus on the Spratly Islands conflict, the thesis explored articles, 
books, journals, websites, and Internet databases for data gathering. All these data 
enabled this research to perceive, conceptualize, examine, and especially to connect all 
evidence of the Spratly Island conflict and Southeast Asia security context together. In 
terms of data gathering, rather than the official website, this study collected data from 
Internet databases and Lund University databases, for instance Lovisa and LUBsearch, 
which can provide various kinds of materials from different fields such as articles, 
journals, theses, e-books, and newspapers. Lovisa is the local library category, which 
provides a variety of books. Furthermore, LUBsearch is a common access to all library 
resources and also connects to several data partners, particularly ISEAS (Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies) (ISEAS, 2013) and CSIS (Center for Strategic and International 
Studies) (CSIS, 2013). The advantage of gathering data from Internet databases is to get 
convenient and reliable sources because they are all approved by Lund University, which 
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has provided this research with accurate citations and references.  
Moreover, EBSCOhost database has provided many related articles and journals. 
EBSCOhost is a database where one can select databases from different fields such as 
economy and political science. From this database, EBSCOhost provided necessary and 
useful information with a wider range of materials, for instance magazines, newspapers, 
journals, and book reviews, which were useful for referencing. In addition, the processing 
through various websites also helped this study with finding online information where 
there are a number of documents relating to the Spratly Islands conflict and Southeast 
Asia from different perspectives such as news, events, meeting, forums, and so on. 
Internet databases facilitated this research tremendously to access different kinds of 
databases and websites. However, a disadvantage of gathering data from articles and 
news on general websites, which are not in academic databases, is that some of the 
sources do not clearly show authors or date of publishing, which are difficult to identify 
and quote. So, the thesis tried to avoid unclear data sources by not using them as 
references.  
In addition, this thesis focused on two main factors as evidence and theory, and it 
also needs data to be able to understand the main content of the hypothesis and 
theoretically explain them. It is necessary to consider all evidences to effectively analyze 
the case. As Gillham (2000) points out that a researcher needs to maintain a case study 
database and combine multiple sources of evidence, whereas he needs to look for 
different kinds of evidence (what people say, what you see them doing, what they make 
or produce, and what documents and records show). Finally, all of these evidences must 
be woven into a narrative account presenting as a chain of evidences; for example, 
documents, policy statements, regulations, and guidelines as key elements to consider 
such case. Records of events, which go back in time, are also included since they may 
provide a useful longitudinal fix on the present situation (Gillham, 2000).  
When it comes to data analysis, this thesis employed a case study approach 
method to analyze the data. A case study approach which focuses on a single place, a 
particular group, or a specific issue, is helpful in scope down research topics such as 
focusing on Southeast Asia security complex concerning the Spratly Islands conflict 
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(Hardwick, 2009, p.441). A case study approach can also mix methods of data collection 
and analysis: quantitative and qualitative methods (Hardwick, 2009). Data accumulated 
by different methods but focusing on the same issue are part of what is called the multi-
method approach, which this thesis has applied (Gillham, 2000). Moreover, reliability 
and validity are significant concerns in order to use the case study as a method. However, 
the reliability and validity are difficult to establish for using the case study. In doing so, 
this study was based on the triangulation of the case study, which is data, events, and 
interpretation. The aim of this thesis overall is to explore the data and events of the 
Spratly Islands conflict simultaneously. Every analyzed level was described in terms of 
data and events that occurred in the region. After that, the interpretation and analysis 
were used to critical analyze the case (Rowley, 2002). 
Furthermore, a case study uses in-depth investigation of a current social 
phenomenon, such as that focused on the Spratly Islands conflict, which can link to the 
Southeast Asian security complex through the ASEAN framework. The research 
question, How did the Southeast Asian region become securitized or desecuritized in the 
period from 2003 until now?, is seen as a descriptive question. Meanwhile, this condition 
correlates with the RSCT as described by Buzan and Waever (2003) that the RSCT works 
as a descriptive framework for area studies such as, in this thesis, the Spratly Islands 
conflict and the emergence of the Southeast Asian security complex (Buzan & Waever, 
2003, p.42). Thus, the thesis employed the case study since the main thrust of a case 
study can be, firstly, descriptive (provide a full portrayal of the case); it provides a trace 
of interaction events over time, describes a culture or subculture and seeks to discover 
key phenomena. Secondly, exploration: it may provide initial analysis of a phenomenon 
that will be explored later and investigated in depth. Finally, explanation: it provides an 
account of what caused a particular phenomenon observed in the study and focuses on 
phenomena in a real-life context. In doing so, when it comes to using a case study 
method, it can be determined by the research question that a study is trying to address 
(Yin, 2012).  
Ultimately, the general perspective of the case study method implemented this 
thesis in order to; first of all, systematically develop a comprehensive describing pattern 
of behavior by concerning ASEAN approaches and the Spratly Islands conflict. 
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Secondly, the method provided an annotated description of the procedure and analysis 
applied to the case. Finally, the case study method developed a sharper awareness of both 
the Spratly Islands conflict and the variety of insights that were gained in the application 
of using the case study method to investigate in depth the Spratly Islands conflict and 
Southeast Asian security complex (Fidel, 1984; Yin, 2012). 
4. FINDINGS: THE APPLICATION TO THE SPRATLY ISLANDS CONFLICT 
CASE  
This thesis aims to investigate the evolution of the Southeast Asian security 
dynamic, conflict management, and security complex approach, in particular, to the 
Spratly Islands dispute. The dispute is one of the reflections of the security management 
within the region, which is growing larger as a regional community. With regard to the 
ASEAN intention in 2003 to be a single community by 2015, the security aspect of the 
Southeast Asian region should be revised since the policy decision factors will be 
changed, whereas the securitization of the region has been fluctuating all the time 
regarding the nature of the Regional Security Complex. It is essential to discuss the 
Spratly Islands in order to understand the background to and the importance of the 
security issue in Southeast Asia. The next part of this thesis will go deeper into the 
significance of the Spratly Islands to the region, which has led to the conflict and the 
concern over the security issue of the Southeast Asian states. The application of the case 
will lead to a clearer view of the response of ASEAN and the implementation of security 
management by the ASEAN states, and also the conditions that cause problems within 
the region, from both outside and domestic sources.  
4.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS  
 In the Spratly Islands conflict, all relevant stakeholders seem to compete for 
natural resources, location, and the important sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 
which connect to the West Pacific and are close enough to all the claimant countries’ 
military strategies (defense). Furthermore, the Spratly Islands are also concerned about a 
great power. China, Japan, and the United States have become acutely aware of the 
importance of this SLOC in the South China Sea for all military and civilian maritime 
traffic from the Persian Gulf across the South China Sea (Silja, 1999; EIA, 2013). 
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Moreover, the claimant who acquired control over the Spratly Islands would bring about 
a radical change to the regional balance of power, as the location of the archipelago is so 
strategic. 
4.1.1 STRATEGIC ASPECT OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS 
These various national efforts to claim the Spratly Islands mainly stem from the 
jurisdictional rights of coastal states over offshore seabed resources according to 
consensus at the United Nations Convention in 1982 on the Law of the Sea: UNCLOS 
(UNCLOS, 1982). This agreement provides an extension of state rights over an island or 
group of islands (archipelago). Furthermore, a state that has territorial sovereignty over 
an island will have the exclusive right to exploit the resources (living and nonliving) of 
the water and seabed surrounding the island (and/or archipelago). With regard to 
UNCLOS, the sovereign state over an island is permitted to establish a 12 nautical miles 
territorial sea and 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around that island 
(UNCLOS, 1982, Article 121). If an entire archipelago obtains recognized sovereign 
independence as an archipelagic state, it has the right to draw a straight baseline between 
the outermost islands and will acquire exclusive rights to explore and exploit resources 
within the area enclosed by that baseline (UNCLOS, 1982, Articles 46-54).  
 
Source: http://workjournal.archipelago.gr/?p=1674 (Accessed 24 April 2013) 
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In contrast, the legal rights to exploit resources offshore non-state archipelagos 
such as the Spratly Islands will flow from the rights to exploit continental shelf offshore 
groups of islands (UNCLOS, 1982, Articles 77 & 81). Consequently, all claimants over 
the Spratly Islands declared EEZ or continental shelf delimitations seaward from points 
fixed by islands over which they asserted sovereignty so that the entire ocean and seabed 
in the Spratly Islands would be subjected to various degrees of national jurisdiction. 
Moreover, security concern and economic interests have brought about the military 
actions to make sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands (Joyner, 1999). 
In doing so, China as one of the claimants is considered the most likely candidate 
to successfully take over the Spratly Islands when one compares every dimension of 
China’s abilities such as its economy, military capacity, and so on with other claimants’ 
capabilities.  Meanwhile, the United States and the Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN) 
would not let China wins its claim. This would result in notable apprehension and fear 
among them. All of them may consider building up their militaries because of their 
historical animosity towards China and if they perceive the hegemonic intentions of 
China. The Spratly Islands conflict would provoke a serious situation within the 
Southeast Asian region so that it might attract involvement from superpowers outside the 
region such as the United States on a global level as defined by the RSCT.  On the other 
hand, these factors also stimulate the Southeast Asian region to find a cooperative 
security as desecuritzed as developing the promotion of norms regarding peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Since the security aspect of the region cannot be analyzed or 
resolved apart from one another. The region security aspect normally generates the 
formative dynamics and structure of a security complex, due to the fact that the threats 
travel short distances in a shorter time. The standard form of the regional security 
complex, the pattern of rivalry, balancing of power and alliance among region states 
could lead to the penetration of external power as well.   
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Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-china-sea.htm   (Accessed 24 Aprill 2013) 
Thus, it can be observed that the Spratly Islands (located in the South China Sea) 
are significant in strategic aspects. Firstly, they connect to other regions such as the West 
Pacific and Malacca Strait. Secondly, especially from a strategic point of view, the 
sovereign states across the area possess legal control of the SLOC, which is necessary for 
maritime strategy and a fruitful fishing area. Furthermore, the areas are possibly rich in 
the natural resources that are economically significant. The countries with territorial 
sovereignty over the area will has the extension of the maritime zone to 200 nautical 
miles around the group of islands (archipelago). This condition has led to claims over the 
Spratly Islands for economic advantages. 
4.1.2 ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS 
 When it comes to the economic aspect, the South China Sea is the fifth biggest 
water area in the world and has an approximate area of around 3.5 million square 
kilometers. The area reaches from the Taiwan Strait to the Malacca Strait. It is 
acknowledged worldwide as having the most crowded maritime traffic in the world. 
Three-quarters of the big oil tankers from the Persian Gulf use this SLOC for 
transportation to Northeast Asia and the West Pacific. Furthermore, the South China Sea 
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(including the Spratly Islands) is not only important to China, Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan as the significant export countries, but also useful for the main maritime 
transportation of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN) (Simon, 2010). Moreover, the 
United States, which is not directly involved in the Spratly Islands conflict, needs this 
significant SLOC for transportation of their goods; for instance, the United States exports 
its goods to the Philippines, Hong Kong, and other East Asian countries through this 
SLOC (EIA, 2013). Moreover, the rising oil demands in the region rely on this SLOC in 
order to import oil from the Middle East and Africa. The maritime transportation in the 
region usually uses this SLOC to connect with other regions around the Asia-Pacific. 
This indicates that the Spratly Islands area (in terms of the SLOC), which is extremely 
economically important, is particularly significant for Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, 
and the West Pacific (Xu, 2013).  
Freedom of navigation through the SLOCs, especially the Spratly Islands and the 
South China Sea, remains strategically essential for the region. Thus the significance of 
the Spratly Islands should be highlighted. They are not only important for strategic 
commercial and military SLOCs, but also for the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources such as oil and gas in the region. Consequently, the struggling claims for 
sovereignty, maritime, and seabed jurisdictions, and the right of fishery over the area, 
have brought all claimant countries into a tangled nexus of regional conflicts and 
rivalries. 
 In addition, economically, the Spratly Islands area is invaluable in terms of 
natural resources such as fishing resources and potential oil and gas resources in the 
seabed surrounding the area. The economic value of the region, especially Southeast 
Asia, is the greatest catalyst in the ongoing dispute among the claimants. The Spratly 
Islands are an important fishery area for all of the littoral countries of the area. This is 
supported by the fact that the most recent incidents among the countries involved in the 
Spratly Islands conflict have revolved around violations of fishing claims in Vietnam, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines by China (and vice versa) as shown in the summary of 
conflict in the South China Sea since the 1980s (see Appendix).  
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 The greatest long-term economic factor is the presence of oil and gas deposits in 
the area around the Spratly Islands. Although little gas or oil has been found to this point, 
geologists have estimated that there may be as much as a billion tons of oil and gas (EIA, 
2013). One of the complications in oil and gas exploration of the Spratly Islands area has 
been the depth of the seabed, which needs advanced technology or development of the 
system for exploration. The natural resources, oil and gas, of the Spratly Islands area 
have become an increasingly important reason for all claimants and the region nearby to 
keep steady on their claims and intention. With regard to the economic aspect, new 
sources of oil and gas are necessary to support the country’s development in every 
dimension, including economic growth and military capacity. Eventually, the need for 
these resources will encourages all involved countries to maintain their intention and/or 
seek a proper solution to achieve their goals or benefits. With regard to Southeast Asian 
domestic oil production, projected to stay the same or decline as consumption rises, the 
region’s countries will look to new sources of energy to meet their domestic demand and 
national interest. Thus the Spratly Islands area offers the potential for the discovery of 
important natural resources (oil and natural gas), creating an incentive to secure larger 
parts of the area for domestic production (EIA, 2013). 
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4.2 THE REGIONAL LEVEL FINDINGS 
4.2.1 THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) 
 
Source: http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-secretariat (Accessed 1 April 2013) 
ASEAN has proved to be the most successful alliance of the third world nations in 
existence since the post-Cold War era. ASEAN is based on the goals of accelerating the 
economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region as well as of 
promoting regional peace and stability. In order to build a globalization of cooperation, all 
small nation states need to work together and they have to make an efficient response rather 
than take an observing role. Small nation states in Southeast Asia established a loose 
cooperation in 1967 called ASEAN, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration 
(Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Later Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Cambodia joined ASEAN, making up what are today the ten member states of ASEAN, 
which are different in politics, culture, and religion. The intention was to have a concrete 
cooperation for increasing regional development and peace within the region. However, 
this notion of unity is just an illusion because it is likely an abstract agreement for such a 
The largest integrated single market in the world (by population)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), est. 1967
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
! 10 member states
! Political alliance, founded in 1967
! Population of 600 million
! Geographical coverage 4.40m m2
! Combined GDP USD 1,800 bn
! Average GDP per capita USD 10,000
Indonesia
Malaysia
Myanmar
Thailand
Brunei
Cambodia
Laos
Vietnam
Philippines
Singapore
Source: ASEAN Secretariat
An area of great diversity: Different People, States, Religions, sizes and different stages of development
Key facts
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union of states rather than a united strength. At the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, the 
ASEAN leaders resolved that an ASEAN Community should be established in order to 
promote partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies. 
Consequently, to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015, the 
Cebu Declaration on the acceleration of the establishment of an ASEAN community by 
2015 was signed at the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007 (ASEAN, 2007). 
Accordingly, ASEAN will promote action collaboration and mutual assistance on matters 
of common interest in economic, social and cultural, technological, scientific, and 
administrative aspects. Moreover, ASEAN not only has to handle the common needs of its 
members, but also has to explore all possible co-operations among member nation states, in 
order to become a successful regional organization with its strategic geopolitical location. 
Consequently, ASEAN shifted its cooperation (from the anti-communist aspect in the very 
beginning foundation period) to the economic cooperation and security community 
simultaneously. 
From the end of the Cold war, ASEAN’s security perspectives were necessarily 
widened. After intending to be a single community in 2003 as an ASEAN community, it 
has become increasingly possible to refer to Southeast Asia as one security complex. 
According to various aspects and many threats such as the enlargement of ASEAN to 
include ten Southeast Asian countries, the regional impact of the economic crisis and 
political consequences, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the emergence 
of China, and the Southeast Asian countries’ security which have all been linked. In 
addition, all Southeast Asian countries have critically agreed that a regional dilemma 
cannot be analyzed and solved separately from the others (Collins, 2003). Further, it can 
be observed that ASEAN tends to concentrate more on economic issues than security 
matters, as we can see from the many ASEAN community summits that always focus on 
ASEAN economic forums. However, in this globalized world where natural resources have 
become more and more vital, many disputes have revolved around overlapping territorial 
claims, particularly where potential natural resources (fishery, gas and oil reserves) are 
involved. To preserve the regional interests, cooperation over security must be ensured and 
highlighted as well as economic cooperation. The Spratly Islands dispute is one of the good 
examples that elaborate the overlapping territorial claims over natural resources, 
 27 
 
commercial shipping, geopolitics, and fishing lanes.  
Regarding the geography of Southeast Asia, the Spratly Islands connect not only 
the Southeast Asia region with others such as Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan), the West Pacific and Indian Ocean (through the Malacca strait), but also the 
Southeast Asian countries themselves together. Consequently, the conflict involves not 
only four of the ten ASEAN members (Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines), 
but also countries from outside the region (China and Taiwan). Moreover, China and the 
United states, as the great power and superpower respectively, are the powers from 
outside the region that penetrate in the conflict and the Southeast Asia region. 
In addition, the core of the South China Sea dispute, especially the Spratly Islands 
conflict, remains an issue of territorial sovereignty and not a compliance with the law of 
the sea issue. While ASEAN, which acts as the institution for the Southeast Asia region, 
tries to reduce the tension in this situation, there are still disputes among claimants most 
of the time. In spite of the fact that ASEAN and China had adopted the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, no legally binding documents 
were drawn up. In addition, the Spratly Islands dispute still exists and has become more 
significant and complicated than the situation in the past. Thus, all related nations should 
consider the dispute in broader aspects and the conditions of policy decision should be 
reconsidered. Since we are in a globalization era, we are intertwined in more various 
dimensions than in the past. Every nation, especially the regional communities, becomes 
more interdependent. There are many approaches affecting the complexity of Southeast 
Asia’s security decision-making involving political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects.  
This situation can lead to the Southeast Asian region searching for cooperation 
over security: a secure community, including the emergence of Southeast Asian security 
(complex). On the other hand, the Spratly Islands dispute can be seen as the trigger factor 
for the region in terms of securitization or desecuritization in which reference object 
should be secured by whom (country, actor, and so on). In addition, the claimant 
countries for the Spratly Islands area will focus on the conflict, which will lead to action 
in the security aspect that may affect the entire Southeast Asia region. Hence, the Spratly 
Islands dispute has created security concerns that could lead to securitization and/or 
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strong integration (security cooperation) as desecuiritization for the Southeast Asia 
region. The Spratly Islands dispute could be viewed as an example potential flashpoint in 
the Southeast Asian region since it not only encompasses a blend of security problems, but 
could also impact such external regional powers as China and the United States and thus 
spill over into a much wider conflict. Consequently, this thesis is interested in the Spratly 
Islands dispute, how claimants and Southeast Asian countries interact, and their potential 
resolutions for the conflict. 
From the perspective of the Southeast Asian region, the security issue can be seen 
throughout the ASEAN framework in terms of building globalization and cooperative 
relations: all small nation states need to collaborate and make an efficient response to 
critical situations rather than act in an observing role. When it comes to the security 
(cooperation) aspect, since ASEAN in 2003 planned to establish an ASEAN Community 
by 2015, ASEAN has developed its security integration along with economic cooperation 
terms by, for instance, establishing the APSC, AEC, and ASCC by 2015. With regard to 
the ASEAN security context, one of the ways to assess its role in managing security in 
Southeast Asia is to examine ASEAN’s mechanisms for managing conflict. It can be seen 
that the constructivist approach to international relations offers the best way to 
profoundly investigate ASEAN’s mechanisms, since the approach goes beyond the 
consideration of power and material interest and draws attention to ideational factors, to 
actors, and agents beyond the state and the possibilities for change. ASEAN, as a regional 
organization, tried to form its security cooperation through region wide inclusiveness and 
conflict avoidance. This can be seen from the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which ASEAN adopted as 
the guideline to resolve the problem in particular border conflicts (Mely, 2005; ASEAN, 
2013). ASEAN intends to maintain a dynamic harmony over any hostile situations among 
its members based on a concept of RSCT concerning patterns of amity and enmity 
(Buzan & Waever, 2003). The commitment of the states to norms of sovereignty, 
noninterference in the internal affairs of member states, nonuse of force, and avoidance 
of conflict was enshrined in the TAC and ZOPFAN. In addition, ASEAN has upheld its 
good relations on the international stage by cooperating with external countries and other 
regions such as APEC (ASIA-Pacific Economic Cooperation), ASEAN Plus Three 
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(ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea) and especially the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), which is the focal point of this thesis. ASEAN hosted the ARF comprising 
ASEAN and dialogue partners in terms of the entire Pacific security dimension (ARF, 
2013). ARF is the most elaborate and security-specific entity among all ASEAN’s rosters 
of instruments in the organization’s institutional development.  
4.2.2 THE ASEAN POLITCAL-SECRUTIY COMMUNITY (APSC)  
 According to the APSC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009), the APSC began over four 
decades of close cooperation and solidarity. The ASEAN heads of states/governments 
envisioned looking outward, living in peace, stability, and prosperity, bonded together in 
partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies. It is 
predicted that the APSC will bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation at a 
higher level. The APSC has promoted political development in adherence to the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and respect for and 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms among ASEAN 
members. It is a means by which ASEAN member nation states can pursue closer 
interaction and cooperation to set up shared norms and create common mechanisms to 
achieve ASEAN’s goals and objectives in the political and security fields by 2015. The 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (ASEAN, 2009) envisages the following three 
key characteristics: 
Key Characteristic Purpose 
1. A community of shared 
values and norms 
ASEAN’s cooperation in political development aims to 
strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the 
rule of law, and promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
2. A unified region with 
shared responsibility for 
comprehensive security 
In building a cohesive, peaceful, stable, and resilient 
Political Security Community, ASEAN subscribes to the 
principle of comprehensive security, which not only goes 
beyond the requirements of traditional security but also 
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takes into account nontraditional aspects vital to regional 
and national flexibility. ASEAN is also committed to 
conflict prevention-building measures, preventive 
diplomacy, and post-conflict peace building. 
3. A dynamic region in an 
increasingly integrated and 
interdependent world 
ASEAN fosters and maintains friendly and mutually 
beneficial relations with external parties to ensure that the 
ASEAN’s member nation states live in peace with the rest 
of the world in a democratic and harmonious environment. 
 
Regarding conflict management, especially border conflict, ASEAN usually 
employs the unique Asian resolution comprising restraint, respect, and responsibility: the 
ASEAN Way. ASEAN uses two types of internal conflict management in terms of border 
conflict as formal and informal mechanisms. Formal mechanisms can be divided into, 
first of all, the institutionalized framework of discussion and consultation mechanisms 
such as the ASEAN Summits, the ASEAN Ministers Meetings (AMM), and so on. 
Second are the institutionalized bilateral mechanisms and processes that are outside the 
formal institutional framework. And the legal instruments that are meant to prevent and 
manage disputes, for instance the TAC, are last. In Southeast Asia, the TAC has had a 
significant role as the key code of conduct governing inter-state relations in the region. 
ASEAN (2011) has continued to uphold the principles of the TAC by:  
(1) The mutual respect of independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, 
and all national identity;  
(2) The right of every state to lead its national existence;  
(3) Noninterference in internal affairs;  
(4) Settlement of differences or disputes in a peaceful manner;  
(5) Renunciation of threat or the use of force; and  
(6) Effective regional cooperation: to foster cooperation and understanding among  
High Contracting Parties and ensure the preservation of peace and harmony in the region. 
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On the other hand, informal mechanisms are used throughout the ASEAN Way, such as: 
adherence to ground rules, emphasis on self-restraint, acceptance of consultation and 
consensus, using third-party mediation to settle disputes, and adjourning while shelving 
the settlement of conflicts (Mely, 2005).  
4.2.3 THE ASEAN-CHINA POLITICAL-SECURITY RELATIONS  
When it comes to political and security relations with China, the claimant country 
over the Spratly Islands, and possible threat to the region, ASEAN-China dialogue 
relations began when Qian Qichen, the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of 
China, attended the opening session of the 24th AMM in July 1991 in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. During the meeting, he expressed China’s keen interest to cooperate with 
ASEAN for mutual benefit. Subsequently, China was accorded full Dialogue Partner 
status at the 29th AMM in July 1996 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The relationship between 
ASEAN and China was elevated to a higher plane with the signing of the Joint 
Declaration of the Heads of State/Government on Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity at the 7th ASEAN-China Summit in October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia and the 
adoption of the Plan of Action (POA) 2005-2010 to implement the Joint Declaration at 
the 8th ASEAN-China Summit in November 2004 in Vientiane, Laos. In order to continue 
to deepen the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, a new POA 
2011-2015 was adopted at the 13th ASEAN-China Summit in October 2010 in Hanoi, 
Vietnam (ASEAN, 2013a). ASEAN and China continued to enhance their close and 
strategic partnership on political and security cooperation through regular dialogue and 
consultations which included summits, ministerial meetings, senior officials and experts 
meetings, as well as broader ASEAN-initiated regional architectural forums such as the 
ARF, ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministers 
Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) (ASEAN, 2013b).  
Focusing on the Spratly Islands, with the desire to promote a peaceful, friendly, 
and harmonious environment in the South China Sea, ASEAN and China signed the 
Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (DOC) in November 2002 in 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia. According to the declaration, all parties agreed to seek peaceful 
solutions to solve disputes within the region. China was the first dialogue partner of 
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ASEAN to accede to the TAC in October 2003 in Bali, Indonesia (ASEAN, 2013b). 
China’s accession to the TAC has contributed to the stature of the TAC as the code of 
conduct for inter-state relations in the region. In 2004, the ASEAN-China Senior 
Officials’ Meeting decided to establish the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group (JWC) 
to implement the DOC. The JWC held its first meeting in Manila in August 2005 and 
provided recommendations in four main contexts: the guidelines and action plan for the 
DOC, specific cooperative actions in the area, an expert for providing recommendations 
to the JWC, and the convening of workshops (Thayer, 2011). However, China opposed 
specific cooperation and specified that ASEAN countries should not practice and consult 
among themselves before meeting with China. China also insisted that the disputes over 
the South China Sea should be resolved by bilateral consultations among relevant parties 
and not with ASEAN (multilateral). China stated that it accepted only bilateral talks for 
resolving disputes (Thayer, 2012). Later China revealed which participating countries 
agreed to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or 
escalate disputes in the areas.  
In 2010, however, there was a report that China identified the South China Sea as 
one of its core interests, confirming by its national flag on the ocean floor near the 
Spratly Islands (Taylor, 2011; Miere, 2011). Consequently, ASEAN and China had 
adopted the new guidelines to implement the DOC on 21 July 2011 in Bali, Indonesia. 
The eight substantive points in the guidelines are as follows (ASEAN, 2011; Thayer, 
2011):  
(1) The implementation of the DOC should be carried out in a step-by-step 
approach in line with the provisions of the DOC;  
(2) The parties to the DOC will continue to promote dialogue and consultations in 
accordance with the spirit of the DOC;  
(3) The implementation of activities or projects as provided for in the DOC 
should be clearly identified;  
(4) Participation in the activities or projects should be carried out on a voluntary 
basis;  
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(5) Initial activities to be undertaken under the ambit of the DOC should be 
confidence-building measures;  
(6) The decision to implement concrete measures or activities of the DOC should 
be based on consensus among parties concerned, and lead to the eventual 
realization of a code of conduct; 
(7) In the implementation of the agreed projects under the DOC, the services of 
experts and eminent persons, if deemed necessary, will be sought to provide 
specific inputs on the projects concerned; and  
(8) Progress of the implementation of the agreed activities and projects under the 
DOC shall be reported annually to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting  
According to the preamble of the new guidelines, the DOC has just been 
identified as a milestone document signed between ASEAN Members and China. The 
guidelines intend to guide the implementation of possible joint cooperative activities, 
measures, and projects. Moreover, the implementation of the DOC will contribute to the 
deepening of the ASEAN-China strategic partnership for peace and prosperity. However, 
it is unlikely that the DOC was an agreement between ASEAN as a group and China. 
Besides, the guidelines are only provisional and none official agreement have been set up 
(nothing has been binding yet). In addition, it also was an inducement for China to take 
concrete action.  
The guidelines for implementing the declaration were agreed at the ARF in July 
2011 following a spate of incidents that had led to rising tension in the region. China in 
particular had been viewed as increasingly assertive, on occasion forcing non-Chinese 
vessels out of what it considers to be its territorial waters and sabotaging the work of 
exploration vessels in the area. In August 2011, China stated that it opposes complicating 
and internationalizing the issue of the South China Sea and insists on resolving disputes 
with its neighbors through consultation and negotiations. That statement was regarded, 
however, as a discursive reference to the United States regarding recent efforts to 
strengthen its diplomatic and military relationships with both established allies in the 
region and countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. In November 2011, China 
went on to propose that a legally binding code of conduct should be negotiated (Taylor, 
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2011). From these actions, it appears that the Southeast Asian security dynamics, through 
the ASEAN framework concerning the Spratly Islands conflict, is more developed in 
peaceful settlement norms. According to the RSCT, this seems to imply that ASEAN is 
becoming desecuritized rather than securitized. For ASEAN to be securitized, it would 
have to include China’s actions, which in turn would lead to inflammation which then 
would need extraordinary means, breaking normal rules and in the worse case scenario, 
using forces to resolve the conflict.  
Further evidence for the development of peaceful solutions according to the 
RSCT can be found in the proposal of Premier Wen Jiabao. Following the proposal of 
Premier Wen Jiabao at the 14th ASEAN-China Summit in November 2011 in Bali, 
Indonesia, China set up the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, with 3 billion 
Chinese Yuan, to provide financial support for ASEAN-China cooperation in the areas of 
maritime scientific research, connectivity, and navigation safety, particularly to 
implement agreed cooperative activities and projects within the DOC framework 
(ASEAN, 2013c). Subsequent to the adoption of the guidelines, four activities were 
implemented in 2012 as part of the implementation of the DOC, namely: (1) Workshop 
on Marine Hazard Prevention and Mitigation in the South China Sea in July 2012 in 
Kunming, China; (2) Workshop on Marine Ecosystems and Biodiversity in August 2012 
in Singapore; (3) Symposium on Marine Ecological Environment and Monitoring 
Techniques in October 2012 in Xiamen, China; and (4) Joint Workshop in 
Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the DOC in November 2012 in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia (ASEAN, 2013c). From these guidelines, it is clear that the desecuritization 
process over the Spratly Islands conflict is reached.  
Another instance where desecuritization is evident is when ASEAN and China 
agreed to set up four expert committees on maritime scientific research, environmental 
protection, search and rescue, and transnational crime, in January 2012. The DOC raised 
the issue of COC again, but China stated that it would discuss the COC at the appropriate 
time or in appropriate conditions (Thayer, 2012a). Meanwhile, the Philippines had tried 
to issue other articles dealing with the COC, which caused a divide between ASEAN 
nations (Thayer, 2012b). As China sought to take a seat at the ASEAN discussion, the 
tension over the Spratly Islands dispute could be seen from the 20th ASEAN Summit in 
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Phnom Penh from April 3 to 4, 2012, where the Philippines and Vietnam objected 
strongly to including China in the discussion (ASEAN, 2012). However, a compromise 
was reached: ASEAN would proceed on its own to draft a COC, while Chinese talks 
would take place through the ASEAN chair.  In June 2012, the ASEAN Senior Officials 
Meeting (SOM) agreed to submit the draft ASEAN proposed key elements of the 
regional COC in the South China Sea to the ASEAN SOM for consideration (Torres, 
2012). In July, there was a discussion between ASEAN and China over the adoptions of 
key elements of the COC, but the original draft of the Philippines was pruned as some 
articles were dropped, whereas the key elements of ASEAN’s draft were reduced to a 
preamble and two articles. In the Philippines draft, two items, which were about the 
principles and norms of internal law, were dropped, though they were about the 
principles on the peaceful uses and cooperative management of the oceans and the need 
to protect the region from any form of increased militarization and intimidation (Thayer, 
2012). Although this instance seems like it is difficult to categorize the agreement under 
desecuritization and securitization, the RSCT makes it possible to categorize it in the 
political sphere. Since a solution cannot be agreed upon in this instance, the issue, 
according to the RSCT, can be resolved in the political sphere.   
Further evidence of becoming desecuritized can be seen in the Philippines’ 2003 
declaration of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. It was 
replaced with the 2006 Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Towards 
an Enhanced ASEAN-China Partnership. Meanwhile, the Philippines’ original proposal 
for a zone of peace, freedom, friendship, and cooperation was modified to an area of 
peace, stability, friendship, and cooperation. In ASEAN’s draft, there were two disputes 
settlement mechanisms included that closely reflected the wording in the Philippine 
working draft. The first mechanism was the dispute settlement mechanism included in 
ASEAN’s TAC. The second mechanism was for cases where parties are unable to resolve 
their dispute within the ASEAN framework by providing a solution under international 
law, including UNCLOS. The International Tribunal should adjudicate the Spratly 
Islands conflict for the Law of the SEA (ITLOS) over maritime jurisdiction (UNCLOS, 
1982, Articles 186-191 & 279-299; Thayer, 2012).  This argument is put into the normal 
political (desecuritization) framework. No special measure processes to deal with the 
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Spratly Islands conflict were included in the agreement, which indicates that the process 
can be seen as the ordinary political framework for the implementation of the code of 
conduct stated in the RSCT.  
In July 2012, ASEAN and China agreed to start talks on a legally binding 
maritime code of conduct to manage the Spratly Islands conflict. Also, in the same month 
ASEAN Secretary General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, confirmed that the first formal meeting 
between ASEAN and Chinese senior officials on the COC would take place in Phnom 
Penh in September 2012. However, the move of China was questioned as on July 11, 
China’s attitude shifted and it refused to begin talks (Thayer, 2012). In addition, the 
document of ASEAN’s proposed elements of a regional COC between ASEAN and 
China was not officially released and still remains an internal draft ASEAN document. 
Even though ASEAN and China have an agreement to resolve the Spratly Island conflict 
peacefully, this event shows that there seems to be no legally binding agreement to 
jointly resolve the conflict. Therefore, it is hard to identify the process either 
desecuritization or securitization, according to the framework of the RSCT.  
4.2.4 THE FRAGMENT OF ASEAN  
At the 45th AMM and related meetings in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in July 2012, 
the meeting aimed to establish the joint communiqué between ASEAN foreign ministers 
(ASEAN, 2012a). The 132-paragraph draft summarized the wide range of issues taken up 
by the AMM. It also summarized the discussion on the South China Sea including the 
standoff at Scarborough Shoal between China and the Philippines. However, in the South 
China Sea section, no joint communiqué was issued. During the summit, the view from 
Cambodia, as the ASEAN chair for 2012, was to limit the issue of maritime borders in 
the South China Sea, despite disagreement from Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia. Cambodia refused to include the dispute over the South China 
Sea in the forum because it preferred bilateral talks with China. The action of the 
Cambodian government conformed to the demand of China that the talks over this 
dispute must be bilateral only, though both sides had agreed on the DOC before. The 
objective was to prevent territorial claims in the South China Sea at the ASEAN level. 
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However, the shape of this issue depends largely on the rise of China as a real great 
power that wants to be a new world superpower. 
This was, according to Cambodia, due to the argument raised by Cambodia, as the 
host for the summit that time, who said that the failure of the 45th AMM to adopt a joint 
communiqué rested squarely with the Philippines and Vietnam and their insistence on 
including a reference to Scarborough Shoal and the natural resources exploration over 
EEZs (Thayer, 2012). The discussion on the South China Sea dispute continued among 
the foreign ministers of the ASEAN nations, and they could not find a unanimous 
agreement as Cambodia disagreed about proposing the joint communiqué and adopting 
the COC. All ASEAN countries wanted to seek a solution for the dispute and adoption of 
the COC with unanimous agreement, but Cambodia stated that there was no consensus. 
Cambodia pointed out the problem of the discussion on Scarborough Shoal, the inclusion 
of the wording on the EEZ and the continental shelf, compromise text that could satisfy 
every party, and the discussion between ASEAN and China on the disputes in the South 
China Sea. The case of the dispute in the discussion was about paragraph 16 of the draft 
joint communiqué, in which it was mentioned by Cambodia that strong wording was used 
(ASEAN, 2012a; Thayer, 2012).  
The failure to issue a joint communiqué at the 45th AMM indicated that there was 
a deal between China and Cambodia as leaked information from unnamed diplomatic 
sources to the press stated that “China bought the Chair, simple as that,” and this was 
supported by Yang Jiechi, Foreign Minister of China, who was quoted as thanking 
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen for supporting China’s core interests (Thayer, 2012; 
Perlez, 2012), since Cambodia received a lot of assistance including military aid from 
China. Although the draft of the joint communiqué was sent to China for consideration, it 
was unacceptable to China, and had to be sent back for amendment. The case of the COC 
for the South China Sea disputes has proved that China has a highly influential power 
over the maritime territory and also the Southeast Asian region. The influence of China 
hung over behind-the-scenes deliberations on the South China Sea in many respects, 
dividing ASEAN countries that are grateful to China and those that are willing to stand 
up to China (Perlez, 2012). ASEAN has tried to talk with China as a regional community, 
but China always refuses and accepts only bilateral talks. In addition, Chinese 
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intervention in the region can be carried out with mutual interest between China and other 
ASEAN members as occurred in the case of Cambodia at the 45th AMM. As a result, 
consensus among ASEAN members can’t be reached unless ASEAN can expel the power 
of China from the region and work together as a real single community in terms of 
politics and economy.  
Although ASEAN has a number of agreements with China, in fact, no legally 
binding documents were drawn up. Moreover, the Spratly Islands conflict still exists and 
it has become more significant and complicated than the situation in the past as shown in 
the summary incidents. China’s action (aggressiveness) has created an anxiety within the 
Southeast Asian region. It can be seen that China’s aggressiveness leads to a revisable 
ASEAN security context. Meanwhile, ASEAN’s objective of creating the APSC by 2015 
is predicated on the assumption that ASEAN members share a common identity and 
responsibility for contributing to peace, stability, and security in Southeast Asia. The 
APSC blueprint (2009) states that one of its goals is to ensure implementation of the 
DOC in the South China Sea and ASEAN tries to achieve this objective blueprint of the 
APSC by calling for a continuation of ASEAN’s consultation among member states and 
working towards the adoption of a regional COC (ASEAN, 2009; Thayer, 2012). 
ASEAN’s failure to issue a joint communiqué after the 45th AMM poses procedural 
questions about the fate of decision-making over the Spratly Islands dispute (on the South 
China Sea) and ASEAN’s community-building. It also urges questions about the status of 
ASEAN’s agreement on the key principles in its draft COC (Emmerson, 2012). 
Furthermore, it is a fact that ASEAN also has more internal competition than 
cooperation. ASEAN needs relations with external powers rather than member nation 
states (Nischlke, 2002).  At this time, this means that ASEAN is unable or unwilling to 
create a balance by itself. This is ASEAN’s weakness in trying to establish regional 
integration. In addition, the ASEAN Way obstructs the creation of a single community 
because the way requires consultation and consensus among members is the biggest 
issue. As a result, any dispute between member states is postponed or left to avoid 
conflicts, which has made ASEAN a peaceful region without any major conflicts in 
recent decades. On the other hand, these aspects result in ASEAN’s slow growth because 
if any nation state does not agree with recognition, the agreement is canceled as agreeing 
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to disagree, as was experienced at the 45th AMM (Mely, 2005). ASEAN should develop a 
peaceful decision-making norm (as desecuritization) being not related to serious aspects, 
which may lead to conflict. Secondly, it is the principle of noninterference that relates to 
the common foreign and international law. In this regard, ASEAN itself is too strictly. 
This creates an obstacle for ASEAN in terms of transnational presence. To solve the 
problem, the member should collaborate together with mutual and trustworthy agenda. 
ASEAN interpreted this strictly because the nation-state members do not trust one 
another sensitively. From now on, ASEAN has to think about regional collaboration and 
increasing trust among member states in order to pursue the single community-building 
goal by 2015. Moreover, with regard to new possible threats such as demands for energy 
and other natural resources, these unresolved disputes, including China’s increasing 
aggressiveness, may become a significant aspect in the future military balance of power 
in the Southeast Asian region, as every country seeks to modernize its military and 
expand its armed forces in order to protect its national interests, and engage other 
international partners, such as the United States, in order to balance the rise of China.  
4.3 THE INTERREGIONAL LEVEL FINDINGS 
4.3.1 THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF) 
At this level, ASEAN tries to use the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to find a 
resolution and the tension reduction in multi-lateral collaborations (as desecuritization 
process). In this section, the thesis will discuss the relation between ASEAN and its 
international relation policy at the interregional level, specifically over the Spratly Islands 
conflict. At the interregional level, ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) in 1994 to maintain peace and stability and to promote regional development and 
prosperity. A brief history of the ARF, its objectives, frameworks, and the performance 
of the ARF over the Spratly Islands conflict will be discussed in order to understand what 
the current approach of ASEAN has achieved and how that applies to the RSCT. 
 After the Cold War ended, the new world order changed and led to the hegemony 
of the United States.  Meanwhile, the United States reduced its military role in the 
Southeast Asian region and began its Chinese friendship policy (Mely, 2005). The 
Southeast Asian region was affected and in fear. Since the region’s security policy was 
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depended upon and had been intertwined with the United States’ anti-communist policy 
for decades, the United States tried to make Southeast Asia peaceful and stable even 
though the Southeast Asian region acted as a neutral region during the Cold War era 
(ASEAN Charter). The United States employed a new policy, namely the East Asia 
Security Initiative (EASI), which gradually reduced the military in Southeast Asia from 
135,000 men to 120,00 men in 1992 (Amitav, 2009). With regard to the EASI, the 
Southeast Asian region without the United States’ security support was suspicious of the 
vacuum of power in the region (Mely, 2005). Meanwhile, China as the rising power in 
Asia was developing its international relations on the global stage and capacities in areas 
such as the economy and military. However, the Southeast Asian countries kept an eye on 
Chinese foreign policy, which was unpredictable. After that, there was differentiation in 
internal political aspects that made all Southeast Asian governments concerned about 
China’s rising power penetration and possible hostile acts in the region. 
 Therefore, at the 4th ASEAN summit in Singapore in 1992, ASEAN members 
agreed to use the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in order to discuss regional 
security aspects and it was agreed to develop governmental level meetings in the form of 
the ARF. The first meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok in 1994 (ARF, 2013). The 
first ARF objective was to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and 
security aspects of common Asia-Pacific interest. The second objective was to make 
contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the 
Asia-Pacific region. At the 27th AMM in 1994 it was stated that the ARF could become 
an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political 
and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF 
partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the 
Asia-Pacific (ARF, 2013a). The ARF comprises ASEAN and dialogue partners in terms 
of the entire Pacific security dimension. The current participants in the ARF are as 
follows: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
the United States, and Vietnam (ARF, 2013). The ARF is the most elaborate and 
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security-specific entity among all ASEAN’s rosters of instruments in the organization’s 
institutional development.   
 The role of the ASEAN political process through the ARF is to employ the ARF 
as a consultative forum on proactive political and security issues. The ARF aims to build 
collaborative understanding, familiarity, trust, and predictability in the behavior among 
member states within the Asia-Pacific region (and outside the region). The ARF 
endeavors to implement throughout the region promotion of trust, cooperation, and good 
relations. Furthermore, preventive diplomacy is developed in order to prevent the 
occurrence and spread of conflict. Then all parties and participants may develop the ARF 
as a forum for discussing and resolving the conflict (ARF, 2013, 2013a). However, the 
ARF is now only the platform for dialogue and consultation. Its status is not the official 
organization. The ARF is just a forum for exchanging perspectives and frameworks 
through which member countries will seek ways to cooperate with an emphasis on the 
participation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military. 
4.3.2 THE ARF FRAMEWORK  
The three (3) stages of the ARF framework is outlined below: 
1. Promotion of confidence-building measures 
This stage is a measuring process to promote trustworthiness among members; the 
main purpose of the stage is to allow member states to meet and discuss continuously in 
order to promote familiarity and trust among members, leading to cooperation under the 
same norm. This process will be carried out via the promotion of international activities 
under the norms of ASEAN, including the declaration to make Southeast Asia become 
the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Southeast Asian Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), and the TAC, which aim to include the ASEAN 
Way and the principle of consultation and consensus. In addition, the measure to create 
trustworthiness among members will not only come from the meetings between 
members, but also the exchanges of security and military personnel. Also, it will include 
the participation of the United Nations (UN) in registering weaponry and distributing the 
defense white papers (Mely, 2005, p.28).  
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2. Development of preventive diplomacy  
At the eighth ARF meeting in 2001, the meeting issued the Concept and Principle 
of Preventive Diplomacy by defining the meaning of preventive diplomacy as diplomacy 
under the consensus agreement; this is a political action agreed to by all relevant 
members, aimed at preventing conflicts between member states, especially those that 
have the potential to threaten the liberty, security, and peace of the region. Also, this 
measure aims to prevent the conflicts that can lead to military confrontations and to 
reduce the impacts of the conflicts. This measure must pass through the process of trust 
construction between members and of mutual norms; it also tries to open channels to seek 
mutual understanding. In addition, the purpose of developing preventive diplomacy is to 
create the diversity that differs from former diplomatic approaches. That is, to open 
opportunities for representatives from other sectors in the society, not from diplomats, 
such as nongovernmental organizations, scholars, and people who have been accepted by 
the society to participate in creating peace and security for that region (ARF, 2001).  
3. The elaboration of approaches to conflicts 
This stage is to develop the mechanism that will be the framework of joint 
operation between member states when there is a problem; it can be implemented when 
every member trusts each other and feels at ease to talk about the problem. This stage 
will lead to mutual solutions of problems (ARF, 2013, 2013a, 2013b). 
Through the ARF meeting it is possible to fit desecuritization into the RSCT 
framework because every stage can explain a peaceful resolution, a mutual co-operation 
and confidence building among the dialogue partners within the Asian Pacific region. 
Furthermore, the importance of the ARF is increasing in every dimension, that is, not 
only in traditional security, but also from the political cooperation and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region to concerns over economic impact. In accordance with the fact that 
the stability of the Asia-Pacific region is challenged with the new format such as nuclear 
weapons, terrorism, transnational environmental problems, epidemic disease, human 
rights, drugs, economic criminals, and so forth, the ARF plays on the significant 
international stage as a collaboration platform. In doing so, the ARF enable former 
enemies to come together at the negotiating table (Mely, 2005). Moreover, it also 
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maintains the predictable environment of international relations among member states 
and helps to promote political cooperation among members in dealing with the problems 
that affect the region’s stability in order to increase the role and credibility of small 
countries as being ARF members (Foong, 1996; Desker, 2001). Hence, the Spratly 
Islands conflict may be compromised and resolved as desecuritization. However, the 
ARF takes place under the ASEAN summit so that the forum is driven by the ASEAN 
principle as host. Regarding the ASEAN Way, the practical experience may hinder the 
development and success of the ARF, as ASEAN experienced in the Regional Level in 
section 4.2.4.  
4.3.3 MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ARF  
The ARF as the stage for the Asia-Pacific dialogue and consultation on security 
and political aspects includes the divergence of member countries, especially China and 
the United States, joining in the same forum. By this, the ARF’s objective is for the 
prevention of easy interference from external regional powers including China as a forum 
member in order to encompass China in a multilateral framework (Hong, 1997). While 
China as a forum member makes use of its benefits in terms of making good international 
relations, especially with ASEAN countries, it is mainly interested in bilateral talks and 
are primarily present for observation purposes. However, China has good economic 
relations, such as the APEC and ASEAN Plus Three. Although the economic relations 
between China and ASEAN are improving and since there is more focus in this area, 
there could be a risk that the security aspect maybe be reduced and separated from the 
economic aspect. Similarly, the United States has the same economic focus, which could 
also risk the reduction in security in this region. This situation corresponds with 
ASEAN’s conviction that the United States should join the forum as a balancing power 
with China in this region. In contrast, have China allow the United States to join because 
it is better to have a multilateral than a bilateral framework, that is, between the United 
States and other members (Naidu, 2000). 
When it comes to the United States’ point of view, it not only observes the 
significance of the region but also maintains its alliance with countries within the 
Southeast Asian region. Moreover, the United States can use the ARF as the balancing 
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stage to China as the rising power in Asia in order to protect its advantages and powers in 
Asia. A good example, which the United States emphasizes, is the unstable situation in 
the South China Sea, especially the Spratly Islands. At the 17th ARF in Vietnam, Hillary 
Clinton, the United States Secretary of State, blamed China for its aggression over the 
Spratly Islands dispute. Moreover, Clinton also referred to the United States as a Pacific 
power and stated that it had a national interest in freedom of navigation, the respect for 
international law, and unimpeded, lawful commerce in the South China Sea. Since then 
the Obama administration has repeatedly stated its commitment to re-engaging with the 
region and strengthening its diplomatic and military ties, having recognized the Asia-
Pacific as growing in strategic significance in the 21st century.  In response to recent 
confrontations in the South China Sea, the United States has also frequently expressed its 
concerns and called for all sides to exercise self-restraint. Subsequently the United States’ 
Navy pledged to increase its presence in Southeast Asia in November 2011 and deployed 
a contingent of US marines to Northern Australia in 2012 (Taylor, 2011).  
As for the ARF itself, it is currently processing the first stage (which connect to 
the second stage); it has just begun to discuss preventive diplomacy, but it is still a long 
way from the implementation process. This is because the countries participating in the 
ARF are still writing the draft ARF preventive diplomacy work plan in order to study 
possible approaches to raising preventive diplomacy measures under the principle that 
there will be no use of preventive diplomacy in domestic issues or bilateral conflicts 
unless in some cases it is approved by concerned countries. However, the development of 
the second stage is limited by various conditions, though most countries are likely ready, 
because some countries still have other conditions, for example China. As a result, to 
fully promote the second stage the ARF needs to take more time, although two decades 
have already passed.  
In terms of performance, the past decade has shown that the performance of the 
ARF is not yet empirical on the international relations level because the objective of the 
ARF is to set up a negotiating forum to stabilize familiarity and trustworthiness among 
members, the first stage of the ARF, which partly deals with the second stage. 
Nevertheless, the attempt to establish negotiations by the ARF regarding its objectives 
was able to partly restrain the conflict between China, Taiwan, and ASEAN countries 
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like Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in the claims of sovereignty over the 
Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. As a result of its strategic importance for shipping 
navigation and natural resources, the archipelago in the sea has become the target of 
those countries. In this regard, ASEAN represented the neutral side, offering a stage to 
these countries to negotiate and resulting in the ASEAN-China DOC in 2002. This 
declaration helped to ease the problem for a while. However, apart from the agreement 
above, the ARF has not yet had anything concrete to show for its work, while the Asia-
Pacific region is still facing many problems that cannot rely on negotiations for solutions, 
especially the Spratly Islands conflict. This is because within ASEAN, there is limited 
capability, a lack of institutional capacity, the issues of historical heritage, and 
international politics, which can be considered that the ARF has only been viewed as a 
“talk shop” (Mely, 2005, p.134). 
In sum, the ARF is the region’s foremost security forum and continues to provide 
a venue to foster dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues of common 
interests and to make significant contributions toward confidence-building and preventive 
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the past performance of the ARF was 
still trivial; though it reduced the tension in the Spratly Islands conflict, this is not a 
permanent solution (Mely, 2005). This is not only because it lacks institutional capacity, 
but also because of the overriding objectives to instill trust and build confidence among 
member states which were getting to know each other during the formative years of 
ASEAN as experienced at the 45th AMM.  
4.4 THE GLOBAL LEVEL FINDINGS 
 In this following section, the thesis will analyze the interference, the internal 
condition and the (hidden) agenda of the global actors, which affect the Southeast 
security dynamics and penetrate in the Southeast Asian region.  Although the RSCT 
defined the new international system as 1 superpower (the United States) plus 4 great 
powers (The EU, Russia, Japan and China) (Buzan & Waever, 2003); the thesis will 
touch upon only the United States and China since both actors have notably significant 
interaction with the Southeast Asian region.  The United States interaction within the 
Southeast Asian region will affect at the global level and the regional level as a 
 46 
 
superpower.  When it comes to China, it is defined as a great power; However, due to its 
power rising especially maritime power and directly involving the Spratly Islands conflict 
as one of the claimants, China’s action can be shifted to affect the global level as 
becoming a new superpower.  Then, it is necessary to investigate, discuss and analyze 
keenly both countries in which they have significant impact to the region and also 
penetration within the region.   
4.4.1 CHINA’S AGGRESSIVENESS 
In the Southeast Asian region, the end of the Cold War led to the military 
confrontation reducing between the United States and the Soviet Union as a proxy war 
within the region. However, regional stability and peace had not yet been achieved. In 
contrast, the withdrawal of United States power (military) from Southeast Asia provided 
a vacuum of power and led to new great power penetration within the region (Buzan, 
2003). As Buzan and Waever (2003) defined the international frame after the Cold War 
era as one superpower (the United States) plus four great powers (China, Japan, Russia, 
and the European Union), China would possibly be the rising (super) power instead of the 
United States within Southeast Asia (and the world) in accordance with its increasing 
budgets in national defense and its actions such as its strategic policy and military 
modernization (Buzan & Waever, 2003; China’s National Defense, 2008, 2013; Buckley, 
2012). 
When it comes to China, China’s history in the 20th century was marked by 
occupation and civil war. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has undergone a 
transformation, which has produced a tremendous economic turnaround such as with 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms (development in four factors: agriculture, industry, 
military, and technology) (Hays, 2008). China has not only become a major trading 
nation, building up an impressive foreign currency holding, but has also been the world’s 
largest economy for a decade. The Chinese leadership has recognized that economic 
reform is the only way to achieve the status it desires on its own terms. Despite not facing 
any threat to its security, China has embarked on a path of radical change to both its 
military strategy and capabilities. The strategic focus has now shifted to the offensive. 
The main theme is power projection and the ability to fight a modern war with advanced 
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technology (Secretary of Defense, 2013).  
Meanwhile, the fundamental issue is that the stability of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) itself represents a concern for both Asia-Pacific and world security. Any 
movement by the West to promote human rights and democracy in China represents a 
direct threat to the existing regime. Since the late 1980s, China has seen many important 
events that have influenced China’s foreign policy. In particular, the Tiananmen Square 
massacre in June 1989 impacted China’s image on the international stage and led to the 
development of China’s unmoving economy. In its effort to emerge as a great power, 
China has changed its security strategy from defensive to offensive. If China wants to be 
a dominant world power as a rising power (a superpower), it will have the potential to do 
so in the current world order. China realizes that economic development is as important 
as the strengthening military; neither aspect can be separated from the other (Hynes, 
1998; Miller, 2006).  
China has also used its economic growth and change in military strategy to 
commence an ambitious military modernization program. For instance, the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (the PLA Navy) is upgrading its fleet with power projection in 
mind. China has an active submarine replacement program in place and has purchased 
Russian Kilo class submarines. New surface vessels are being built and the PLA Navy is 
paying more attention to replenishment of sea capability. It is considered that China 
concerns about the secured maritime interests in a crisis time. The PLA Navy upgrading 
corresponds with China’s maritime territorial claim over the Spratly Islands and the 
South China Sea, which is the focus of this thesis (Erickson & Collins, 2007; O’Rourke, 
2013).  
It is clear that China’s economic and military transformation has been aimed at 
challenging the balance of power existing in the region since after the Cold War. China is 
an emerging power, particularly as a maritime power, with global commercial and 
military modernization. Therefore, maritime security has become a significant strategic 
concern of China (Erickson & Collins, 2007). It is considered that China has 
demonstrated hegemonic intentions through its territorial claims in the South China Sea, 
especially over the Spratly Islands. A more aggressive and expansionist policy may 
develop as China faces more pressure to provide food and resources for a quarter of the 
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world’s population. With its ongoing effort to develop a high-technology economic 
system, China has set the foundation that will likely ensure that it gets much stronger and 
perhaps even more powerful than the US (China’s National Defense, 2013).  
The economic and military transformation of China is well underway. It is critical 
that the world, especially its neighbors, is not naive to its intentions. Moreover, with 
China’s ambitions concerning maritime territorial claims, the Southeast Asian region has 
been facing a possible threat from China (China’s aggressiveness) in the future. 
According to China’s maritime territories claim, China claims its territories and waters in 
the South China Sea as the 9-Dash line, which covers the Spratly Islands (Xu, 2013).  
The line is contested by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Since 
China submitted a new map to the UN in 2009, it has caused controversy concerning 
sovereignty over the area and demarcation. China issued new passports in late 2012 
containing a map that covered the disputed territories based on the line, which drew fresh 
international criticism and reaction. Although ASEAN countries, for instance the 
Philippines and Vietnam, have contested this disputed boundary, China has insisted on its 
historical legitimacy of the boundary based on survey expeditions, fishery, and naval 
patrols since the 15th century, putting it at odds with the boundaries complying UNCLOS 
1982 for the region since 1994 (Xu, 2013). China’s PLA Navy and fishery protection 
vessels have increased patrols in the boundary within the EEZ of claimants. Moreover, 
China has offered leases on petroleum exploration blocks within the EEZ of Vietnam 
despite the fact that China has no right to claim an overlapping territory (Desker, 2012). 
Thus, China’s rising global presence and its relationship with its neighbors, particularly 
ASEAN nations, will be reviewed and analyzed in this thesis.  
4.4.2 CHINA’S MILITALY MODERNIZATION  
China as a rising power has embarked on its ambition to increase its capacities as 
a comprehensive national power in many dimensions such as in political, economic, 
military power (modernization), technological, and diplomatic aspects (Dewan, 2010). 
According to China’s National Defense White Paper 2013, China’s armed forces have 
broadened their visions of national security strategy and military strategy, aimed at 
winning local wars under the conditions of informationization, made active planning for 
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the use of armed forces in peacetime, dealt effectively with various security threats, and 
accomplished diversified military tasks (China’s National Defense, 2013). When it comes 
to informationization, Navarro and Autry (2011) explained that informationization aims 
to counter the United States’ distant force projection, which protects freedom of 
navigation, especially for aircraft carriers. China’s informationization creates a network 
of information flows that will pinpoint and target the United States’ Navy forces from 
thousands of miles away, notably new satellite and missile strike capabilities. China’s 
goal is to network by using low-tech devices, particularly fishing vessels, along with 
high-tech devices like those of the military. This could possibly increase the detection 
capability of fishing vessels as invisible sources. The correlation between China’s PLA 
Navy and fishery protection vessels has increased patrols in the boundary within the EEZ 
of claimants. China is creating the network of information connection that links up lowly 
civilian fishermen with military and intercontinental missiles in order to fight the United 
States military and other enemies before they can get within attack range of China’s 
mainland (Navarro & Autry, 2011). 
 China has gradually expanded all capacities for supporting its military, 
particularly the PLA Navy. This can be seen from the changing strategy of offshore 
defensive operations and integrated maritime operations capabilities such as from coastal 
to far sea defense. The improved strategy is significant because of trade and energy 
security concerns. For this reason, China needs to confirm for its secured SLOCs that 
become more important for Chinese maritime interest. Consequently, this situation has 
become the basis for China to extend its maritime defensive perimeter and consequently 
improve its ability to influence and protect initially regional and subsequently global 
SLOCs (Dewan, 2010). 
 As a correlation with the expansion of China’s maritime economic interests, the 
PLA Navy employs a strategy for far sea defense calling for the development of China’s 
long-range naval capabilities in order to preserve China’s maritime security and the 
protection of China’s flourishing and widespread maritime economic interests (Lin, 
2010). The PLA Navy wants to protect its transportation routes and secure its SLOCs. 
The far sea defense strategy is significant for two reasons. First, it shifts the extent of its 
naval ambitions beyond its traditional coastal area (inshore). Secondly, it extends the 
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responsibilities of defense to include China’s maritime economic interests. The 
redirection of China’s armed forces may derive from China’s perceived need to project 
power beyond its coastal area to where the PLA Navy is required to carry out the newly 
expanded far sea defense duties. 
In line with China’s far sea defense strategy, the PLA Navy employs three-stage 
strategy modernization plans (China’s National Defense, 2008, 2013). The PLA Navy has 
developed cooperation capabilities in distant seas and countering nontraditional security 
threats in order to support its new strategy of far sea defense. On account of this, firstly, 
the PLA Navy aimed to develop a technologically modernized and networked naval 
capability (2002-2010) within the first island chain comprising islands that stretch from 
Japan in the north to Taiwan and the Philippines in the south as the 9-Dash line, which 
covers the Spratly Islands. The second stage (2010-2020) is to transform the PLA Navy 
into a regional naval force, which can operate beyond the first island chain to reach the 
second island chain, which includes Guam, Indonesia, and Australia. Finally, in the third 
stage it seeks to transform itself into a global force capable of blue-water operations 
(Blue Water Navy) by the middle of the 21st century (Cole, 2010). 
 
Source: http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/assets/images/South_China_Sea_2.jpg (Accessed 1 June 2013) 
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 Furthermore, China realizes that the naval forces alone are not able to cover all its 
territories, so that China itself has to recruit better ways than using forces as well. China’s 
willingness needs to not only protect trade and energy resources, but also secure maritime 
transportation and cargo vessels in order to confirm and strengthen its future (Dewan, 
2010). As a result, the overall far sea defense strategy reflects increasing willingness and 
self-confidence to assert its interests in and around the East and South China Sea 
(including the Spratly Islands). For instance, in correlation with the support for China’s 
far sea defense strategy, China in 2012 increased the military (the PLA) budget by 11.2 
percent (about 110 billion US dollars) which represented the vanguard of an increase in 
the significance of the international arms trade as a share of 6 percent of the arms 
imported worldwide, which ranked second highest in the world and has increased steadily 
over the past two decades with no downturn (Buckley, 2012; SIPRI, 2013). Meanwhile, 
the area of China’s interest within this strategy overlaps with the United States Navy’s 
area of supremacy. It indicates a signal to the end of Unipolar (the era of dominant world 
power by the United States), which does not want to share its interest and influence. 
Moreover, this situation leads to concern not only over the United States, but also 
amongst the Southeast Asian region as a neighbor of China. It could possibly be the 
Chinese intention to challenge the security context (in particular the maritime security) 
that will affect the Southeast Asian region and the world as regards China’s 
aggressiveness.  
In terms of the significance of the Spratly Islands, the mutual benefits of regional 
(economic) integration should be given high priority and provide further compelling 
incentive for cooperation on natural resources, conservation, and security movements 
because of rich resources (Rosenberg, 2011). In contrast, despite numerous conflict 
incidents over the Spratly Islands, it is perceived that China has increased its power in 
order to take over all the disputed area. Furthermore, among all the claimants, China can 
be seen as a possible threat that makes others suspicious in particular among claimants. In 
recent years, China has developed dramatically according to its national strategy as a 
comprehensive national power, in particular with its maritime interests that represent the 
most significant wealth resources. By doing this, China needs an enhancing national 
power in order to protect, secure, and possibly become a challenging superpower in the 
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future. This leads to an effect on the arms race and military modernization within the 
region simultaneously. Moreover, China’s maritime defense strategy is underway in 
increasing its power in order to pursue its strategy for far sea defense into the blue-water 
navy by 2020, in particular the first island chain, the second island chain, and including 
the conflict over the Spratly Islands. China realizes that when China has strength in 
economic and military power, no one will be able to challenge it.  
4.4.3 EFFECT TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECRUITY DYNAMIC (China) 
China has stepped up its power as a rising (super)power and has the most 
aggressive stance in terms of conflict resolution. In the same way, China has increased 
economic development and military capabilities simultaneously, especially the PLA 
Navy, in order to take over all its territories. This situation indicates the apparent possible 
threat of China to others, particularly Southeast Asian countries as its neighbors and 
countries involved in conflict, which leads to an increase in untrustworthiness in terms of 
using force for conflict solution. In addition, China’s military modernization and strategy 
bring an anxiety to Southeast Asian countries as its neighbors and involved claimants in 
the Spratly Islands dispute. It can be considered that the Southeast Asian region has been 
worried and agitated by China’s aggressiveness in terms of its military modernization and 
strategic policy as a possible threat in the securitization context of the region.  
In addition to the reducing role of the US military in the Southeast Asian region 
after the Cold War era, the region has not been stable and peaceful. Moreover, the 
vacuum of power enables China to be a new superpower as a rising great power in the 
Southeast Asian region. Over the past two decades, a rising China has economically 
interpenetrated into Southeast Asia and become its largest trading partner. At the same 
time, Southeast Asia’s maritime territory, particularly the Spratly Islands, has become a 
regional security flashpoint. China has asserted sovereignty over the Spratly Islands area; 
meanwhile, a number of littoral countries have advanced more modest territorial claims. 
When it comes to China’s strategic shifts, which will affect Asia-Pacific balancing 
including the United States that had been reviewed with concern in China’s latest 
National Defense paper, China has found territorial aggressiveness (China’s National 
Defense, 2013). 
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The Southeast Asian region has increased the dynamic of regional security 
cooperation through ASEAN; however, ASEAN itself has never been successful in 
conflict resolution. Consequently, every country in the Southeast Asian region feels 
insecure. ASEAN countries struggle too hard to pursue and develop their military 
capacities. This condition leads to arms races, security dilemmas, and instability within 
the Southeast Asian region, and urges tension in the conflict over the South China Sea, 
including the Spratly Islands, as well as affecting the stability and security within the 
Southeast Asian region. Furthermore, Southeast Asian countries have increased their 
military budgets with a 6 percent enlargement in military spending in 2012 (33.7 billion 
US dollars), which has grown steadily over the decades (SIPRI, 2013). Recently, China 
has employed dynamic military exercises to intimidate other claimants and overlay these 
tensions over the Spratly Islands, which creates an emerging maritime rivalry and 
cooperation amongst Southeast Asian countries, China, and the United States. Whether 
China’s peaceful rising as defined itself accounts for more than rhetoric will be tested in 
Southeast Asia’s maritime territory, especially the Spratly Islands, early and often.  
Most important is China’s behavior (aggressiveness), which alarmed the 
Southeast Asian region and the United States as a superpower, and led them to seek 
securitization. Now this situation, including the Spratly Islands conflict, is a complicated 
subject. Southeast Asia and the United States believe that the pattern of China’s 
aggressive far sea defense and the 9-dash line map reflected a high level and integrated 
decision to toughen policy at all points on China’s territory. China’s actions over the 
Spratly Islands and the South China Sea suggest a change in fundamental policy and 
aggressive implementation of China’s long-term strategy that bring an anxiety to its 
neighbor as the Southeast Asian region and the United States as the balancing power to 
China within the region (Bush, 2012). 
4.4.4 THE UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT  
 The United States is a (another) superpower from outside the region that wants to 
take its participation or penetration as defined by the RSCT in the South China Sea with 
this thesis focusing on the Spratly Islands conflict. This is due to the significance of the 
Spratly Islands’ location. According to a statement made by top officials in the Obama 
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administration’s pivot to Asia, the United States has a range of national interests in the 
Spratly Islands dispute. As General Dempsey (2013), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, claims, the definition of the Obama administration’s decision to pivot toward Asia 
as a policy widely interpreted as a response to China’s expanding influence (China’s 
aggressiveness), the United States sought to be a stabilizing factor and its absence would 
be destabilizing. After a decade of focusing on Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States 
has now carried out an Asia-Pacific policy as bringing more interest, more engagement, 
and more quality assets to the Asia-Pacific region (which includes Southeast Asia and the 
Spratly Islands area) (Moss, 2013; Perlez, 2013). 
4.4.5 THE OBAMA’S ADMINISTRATION PIVOT TO ASIA 
In accordance with a report published by the Council on Foreign Relations, a 
report outlines four major reasons why the United States has national interests in the 
South China Sea, as follows: (1) Upholding global rules and norms such as freedom of 
navigation; (2) Alliance security and regional stability that the United States is expected 
to uphold to ensure stability; (3) Economic interests pertaining to shipping lanes where 
1.2 trillion US dollars of United States’ goods pass through each year; (4) Cooperative 
relationship with China from which both states benefit (Glaser, 2012, pp.4-6). These 
national interests are substantial and guide the United States’ policy within the Asia-
Pacific region. 
Apart from the attempts to exploit enormous resources in the sea by China, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, the freedom of navigation 
within the region is also a contentious concern, especially between the United States and 
China. The tension in the region around the Spratly Islands has been developed by the 
growth of the modernized military of China and its regional intentions. China has 
employed its military modernization, especially naval capabilities, to enforce its 
sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. Meanwhile, China is 
developing capabilities that may put the United States forces at risk in the South China 
Sea conflict. Regarding the growing importance of the relationship between the United 
States and China, the Asia-Pacific region, and the global economy, the United States has 
a dominant interest in penetration and preventing any disputes in the Spratly Islands 
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located in the South China Sea from intensifying force operations (Glaser, 2012). To put 
it another way, Patrick Ventrell (2012), acting deputy spokesperson in the office of press 
relations, states that: 
As a Pacific Nation and resident power, the United States has a national interest in 
the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of 
navigation, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea. We do not 
take a position on competing territorial claims over land features and have no 
territorial ambitions in the South China Sea; however, we believe the nations of 
the region should work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes 
without coercion, without intimidation, without threats, and without the use of 
force (Ventrell, 2012, n.p.) 
In accordance with the national interest of the United States alliance in South East Asia, 
support is needed from the United States in order to balance the rise of China within the 
region. However, as stated above, they believe that this is an issue for the South East 
Asian region and the surrounding nations around the South China Sea. 
Moreover, the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia has embarked on an effort to 
develop and strengthen regional institutions by building out the architecture of Asia, 
which reflects Asia’s urgent need for economic and diplomatic security. And the reason 
for this is to make an effective regional architecture, which is able to lower the barriers 
on shared challenges. It creates dialogues and structures that encourage cooperation, 
maintain stability, resolve disputes through diplomacy, and help ensure that countries can 
rise peacefully. There is no underestimating the strategic significance of the Southeast 
Asian region. The ten ASEAN countries have a population of over 600 million and 
impressive growth rates in countries like Thailand (a 25-percent increase in international 
investment in 2011) suggest that ASEAN nations are going to become more important in 
politics and economy. Furthermore, the Obama administration signed ASEAN’s TAC on 
18 February 2009, which led the United States to become the 16th non-Southeast Asian 
country to accede to the TAC and appoint the first resident US Ambassador to ASEAN 
(ASEAN, 2009a). In addition, the United States’ President has traveled every year to 
meet with ASEAN’s leaders since taking office and will do so going forward, and he has 
made a decision to participate at the Head of State level every year at summits on trade, 
energy, and security such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), a forum with ASEAN in a 
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leadership position held annually by the 16 countries in Southeast Asia, China, Japan, 
South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, consistent with the United States’ goal 
to elevate the EAS as the premier forum for dealing with political and security issues in 
Asia (White House, 2013; EAS, 2013).  
The region’s political and security capabilities, challenging the peace and 
prosperity of Asia (including Southeast Asian region) will be tested by the wealth of 
resources in the South China Sea, especially around the Spratly Islands.   Even the United 
States also involves by firmly opposing to any coercion or the use of force for advancing 
territorial claims. It seems that peaceful, collaborative, and diplomatic efforts, consistent 
with international law, are able to bring about lasting solutions that will respond to the 
interests of all claimants and all countries in this vital region, including China (Donilon, 
2013). 
The United States has significant concerns over the Spratly Islands in terms of 
geopolitical, security, and economic interests. A peaceful resolution over the Spratly 
Islands dispute should be considered according to international law. Failure to uphold 
international law and norms could damage the United States’ interest as freedom of 
navigation is of critical interest to the United States and other regional states, particularly 
Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, to lose power over the South China Sea means the 
loss of navigation control for the United States. Although China always asserts that it 
supports freedom of navigation over the disputed area, China’s military modernization 
and capacity development in terms of denying the United States naval access to those 
disputed water territories provides rational evidence of China’s intentions to block 
freedom of navigation. 
4.4.6 EFFECT TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECRUITY DYNAMIC (US) 
  The United States of America has a normative commitment in that it is 
committed to peaceful conflict resolution in the Spratly Islands conflict. However, the 
United States’ allies around the South China Sea such as the Philippines and Vietnam 
have tried to seek support from the United States for peace and stability in the region, and 
for securing SLOCs in the region. Claimants and non-claimants over the Spratly Islands 
view the United States’ forces as a necessity to allow decision-making and freedom from 
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intimidation in order to balance the rising power of China within the Southeast Asian 
region. As could be seen from the post-Cold War era, when the United States reduced its 
forces in the region, Southeast Asia came to an unstable peaceful condition, which 
provided a security dilemma as embarkation on costly and potentially destabilizing arms 
buildups increased their military budgets with a 6 percent enlargement in military 
spending in 2012 (SIPRI, 2013). Failure to reassure allies in the Southeast Asian region 
could also undermine the United States’ security guarantee in the broader Asia-Pacific 
region, since ASEAN as the representative of the Southeast Asian region had always 
wanted the presence of the United States in the region as a force for stability (Petty, 
2012).  
On the other hand, the United States avoids getting drawn into territorial disputes 
and conflicts by Southeast Asian countries that are asking the United States to support 
some countries like the Philippines and Vietnam. In one such case, the Philippine desires 
the extended territorial scope of the United States’ defense commitment to include the 
Spratly Islands where the dispute is located. The fundamental reality is that most ASEAN 
countries want to have a good relationship with the United States, and China is no 
exception. China wants the benefit of economic engagement and a reduction of tension 
over the Spratly Islands. From the United States’ perspective, it wants a security hedge in 
the region. Meanwhile, ASEAN may not want to get crushed in between the United 
States-China competition for power. On the other hand, it does want a balanced 
competition to exist. Actions in the Spratly Islands issue indicate that there is no change 
in fundamental policy by a more aggressive implementation of China’s long-term 
strategy to delay resolution of the fundamental disputes. The important concern is that 
various ASEAN countries have regarded those actions connected to China as threatening 
their interests. That being the case, it is neither surprising that they looked for the United 
States’ action within the region, nor that the United States responded. The pivot to Asia 
or rebalancing of the United States’ policy was really the cumulative expression of that 
response. The United States acted differently in different aspects. It was more careful in 
its response and conscious of the risk that some of its allies in Southeast Asia might try to 
lock the United States into its own agendas and of the need to reassure China that the 
United States is not implementing a policy of containment. But one of the threads that run 
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through the pattern of the United States’ behavior is that the United States reacted to the 
response of its Southeast Asian friends and to China’s actions (Bush, 2012). 
The Spratly Islands conflict and the emergence of the Southeast Asian security 
complex may be the critical challenges in the coming years to the United States’ 
engagement with Asia. The essential ingredient in facing these challenges is the United 
States’ leadership. The United States needs to play an active role in helping the countries 
of the region to enhance their capacity to succeed. The Southeast Asia region is vital to 
the United States’ interests not only in the Asia-Pacific context, but also globally, as the 
Southeast Asian region has a profound impact on the United States’ trade, alliances, and 
partnerships. As the region continues to grow and as new groupings and structures take 
shape, the United States should be a player, not a distant observer (Campbell, 2010). 
Furthermore, diplomatically and strategically, the Southeast Asian region will be 
the site of a contest for influence between China and the United States from now on and 
in the near future. China in particular has expanded its presence and influence in 
Southeast Asia by decades. China’s increasing presence has jeopardized the United 
States’ influence. It could be considered that the United States and China are not 
intertwined in a zero sum game situation in the Southeast Asian region, that some of 
China’s actions have made some Southeast Asian states wary of China’s actions since the 
last decade, and that China’s diplomacy and policy in Southeast Asia are perceived as 
successful actions because China has tended to prioritize mutual agreements, while 
putting off issues that are more difficult to resolve. Regarding the United States’ interests, 
China’s increasing presence in the Southeast Asian region has made the region eager to 
see a strong presence from the United States. Moreover, the motivation that leads to the 
United States’ increasing engagement with ASEAN has been the desire to support 
Southeast Asia’s political stature through the coming APSC and balance China’s rising 
power as China expands its influence in the region (Manyin, Garcia & Morrison, 2009).  
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
According to the RSCT, this theory is an “expected substructure and has 
important mediating on how the global dynamics of great power polarity actually 
operates across the international system” (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p.68).  By doing this, 
the RSCT, based on durable patterns (amity and enmity) among units in the regional 
security complex, makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretation of 
regional security actors.  Due to the RSCT framework, this theory focuses on 
securitization and desecuritization (or both) and are interlinked in that their security 
problems cannot be analyzed or resolved apart from one another among units in the 
region. Applying this to the Southeast Asian region, this research defined the Southeast 
Asian region as locked in to the regional security complex including their neighbors such 
as China, seen in this study. In practice, the use of particular conflicts as indicators such 
as the Spratly Islands conflict is not that different from the analysis generated by a 
traditional perspective, since it operates from the security issues that are on the agenda 
(Buzan & Waever, 2003).  It is also in accordance with the great power – China - and 
superpower - the United States: both actors penetrate within the region and range over the 
global level.   
The emergence of the Southeast Asian security complex can be effectively 
illustrated by applying the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Regarding the 
overall structure of the RSCT, the Southeast Asian region can be identified as the 
regional security complex by the mutual geopolitical boundary, composed of ten country 
members, and social construct through the regional institute: ASEAN. Moreover, the 
RSCT helps this thesis in framing the focusing levels as regional (the relation among 
countries in the region), interregional (the relation among regions), and global level (the 
interaction of regional dynamics with super power). On the other hand, the RSCT 
reaffirm that the regional level represents a distinct ontological level of analysis, with 
blending the regional and global levels together in the international system through the 
existence of a regional framework, and the penetration of global actors. Even the findings 
derived from only the Spratly Islands conflict case are possibly not enough to confirm 
entirely the emergence of the Southeast Asian security complex.  
The aim of this thesis has been to intensely investigate the evolution of the 
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Southeast Asian security dynamic, conflict management, and security complex approach, 
in particular the Spratly Islands dispute since 2003. The dispute is one of the reflections 
of the security management within the region, which is growing larger as a regional 
community. With regard to the ASEAN intention in 2003 to be a single community by 
2015, the security aspect of the Southeast Asian region has been revised since the policy-
decision factors has changed. In addition, the (de)securitization of the region has been 
fluctuating all the time regarding the nature of the Regional Security Complex. 
Consequently, it is very essential to discuss about the Spratly Islands conflict in order to 
understand the background and the important of security issue of Southeast Asia, as well 
as to illustrate the role that the Spratly Islands conflict played in the emergence of 
Southeast Asian security complex.  
In answering the first research question, How did the Southeast Asian region 
become securitized or desecuritized in the period from 2003 until now?, the thesis 
explores Southeast Asian securitization through ASEAN approaches since it intended to 
be a single community in 2003. The thesis illustrates how ASEAN as an institution 
representative of the Southeast Asian region takes action in order to become regionally 
desecuritized. The Southeast Asian region qualifies as an RSC, which distinguishes it 
from neighbor regions, and has a unique conflict management approach known as the 
ASEAN Way. ASEAN has tried to shift the security context into mutual concern as 
ASEAN’s security goal in the APSC. Moreover, focusing on the Spratly Islands conflict, 
ASEAN has tried to turn the conflict into an important issue that needs to be peacefully 
resolved or sought the reduction of tension and confidence building among all claimants. 
For instance, ASEAN sought multilateral cooperation, guidelines of implementation for 
the DOC, the balancing of the United States within region, and also the resolution on the 
international stage such as through the AMM and the ARF. Moreover, the thesis has 
found that the processes of (de)securitization among Southeast Asian countries is so 
interlinked (interdependence) that their security context cannot be analyzed or resolved 
apart from one another as shown in the 45th AMM. The thesis also tries to entirely 
investigate the Southeast Asian security approach through the ASEAN framework, 
conflict transformation, and a pattern of security interdependence, a security regime that 
is restrained by an agreed set of rules of conduct, and a security community where 
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member states settle their dispute in some way other than through the use of force 
concerning the Spratly Islands conflict. Thus, this thesis has also been able to answer the 
question pertaining to how this (de)securitization is reflected in the Spratly Islands 
conflict and its management. 
However, it is a fact that ASEAN has also seen internal competition more than 
cooperation. ASEAN still rely on the relationship with external powers rather than 
member nation states. At this time, the concerns that ASEAN is unable to create a 
balance by itself become perceptible. This is ASEAN’s weakness in trying to establish 
regional integration. In addition, the ASEAN Way, which is one of the primary causes, 
obstructs the creation of a single community because of the ways that require 
consultation and consensus among members. As a result, any dispute between member 
states or between member states and outside such as the Spratly Islands conflict will be 
postponed or left to avoid conflicts, which made ASEAN become a peaceful region (from 
an outside perspective) without any major conflict in recent decades. On the other hand, 
these aspects result in the slow growth of the ASEAN security aspect because if any 
nation state does not agree, the agreement will be canceled as agreeing to disagree, as 
experienced in the 45th AMM.  
The finding of investigation provides some support that when it comes to the 
Spratly Islands conflict (only), the resolution and tension reduction of the Spratly Islands 
conflict are implemented through the emergence of the Southeast Asian security complex 
by reaching the process of the political community. It can be considered that the (entire) 
Southeast Asian region has reached to the desecuritization by concerning only the Spratly 
Islands conflict. The significance of the Spratly Islands and the sovereignty over these 
territory are valued as the referent object, which needs to cope with peacefully settling 
conflict and leads to cooperation measures such as setting joint working groups, the 
implementation for DOC and the calling for mutual concern in the Southeast Asian 
region. Although some of ASEAN members, for instance the Philippines and Vietnam, 
want to promote the Spratly Islands dispute (as the securitization of the region) via an 
international stage such as the ARF and the AMM; however, with regarding to the 
intention of creating amity between relevant countries in the region, these process can be 
observed that the ASEAN security dynamic and framework for resolve the Spratly 
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Islands conflict turn the Southeast Asian region to become desecuritized.  Moreover, the 
finding of this intense investigation found that due to the unity in the community, the 
ASEAN Way, the lack of institutional capacity, and the penetration of external powers 
might obstruct the implementation of this plan. Consequently, from now on, ASEAN has 
to not only concern more on regional collaboration but also increase trust among member 
states in order to pursue the single community-building goal by 2015.  
Furthermore, this thesis has also provided an answer to the last (sub) research 
question on the role the Spratly Islands conflict has played in the emergence of the 
Southeast Asian security complex. By doing so, the thesis has demonstrated the 
significance of the Spratly Islands in affecting the regional (the Southeast Asian region) 
and global level (the United States’ balancing of the rise of China) in terms of strategic, 
economic, and maritime transportation. The Spratly Islands conflict can be seen as one of 
main trigger factors that lead to a major concern of the Southeast Asian security aspect 
due to its significance, the rise of China and China’s aggressive maritime territorial 
claim. Moreover, these conditions affect all claimants over the Spratly Islands conflict 
and also the global actors such as the United States so that they have to focus on these 
factors for their national interest. This condition affects and leads to the domestic 
perspective. Thus, the further research and consideration should be conducted by 
focusing on the domestic perspective of each Southeast Asian country and involved 
countries that did not touch upon in this thesis in order to make fruitful conclusion of the 
emergence of the Southeast Asian security complex. In addition, the domestic politics is 
also significant in order to understand the claimants’ perspective concerning the Spratly 
Islands and China’s actions. As China’s economy and politics are growing stronger, other 
claimants carefully balance defense of their territorial claims and management of their 
relationship with China. These conditions correspond with the RSCT as well as being 
influenced by historical narratives and economic situations.  
Although ASEAN and China have made a number of firm agreements, no 
settlement or legally binding of the conflict has been officially reached to date. The 
relationships between ASEAN and China have improved slightly in terms of economic, 
confident-building, and security agreements. However, it is not reasonable to give up on 
the Spratly Islands conflict; the political and security concern will be to end the dispute 
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that exists, as many efforts and public statements prove. Maybe, time, diminishing arms 
forces expenditures, and increasing cooperation within the Southeast Asian region will 
heal the conflict and force the countries to settle or to resolve the dispute in the near 
future. 
Meanwhile, the methodology resulting from a single case research, the Spratly 
Islands conflict, has limited possibilities to be generalized to other cases. However, I 
would argue that this investigation could be another example to other regions in terms of 
the different regional system and penetration by global actors. It is not easy to say that the 
emergence of the Southeast Asian security complex and its security dynamic (concerning 
the Spratly Islands dispute) could be transferred to other regions without taking into 
account the regional context. The finding would probably not be applicable to regions 
including global actors. Therefore, I suggest that further studies are carried out to 
investigate primarily how progress in the Southeast Asian Security Complex framework 
could be applied to other RSCs and secondly security dynamics and interaction between 
RSCs and global actors. Moreover, although the RSCT focuses on four main levels, 
domestic, regional, interregional, and global, this thesis has just touched upon the 
regional level, which can lead to only the ARF at the interregional level in this thesis and 
a few studies about the global actors (China’s aggressiveness and the United States’ 
perspective). Meanwhile, the domestic level, for instance all claimant countries, would be 
relevant for further security studies. A matter of particular interest would be to study the 
broader aspects such as nontraditional threats. My study has just focused on security 
linked to maritime territorial disputes but not the rise of new security aspects such as the 
economy, terrorism, climate change, and so on.  
In sum, after the Cold War era, the world was not located in Bipolarity (the 
United States and the Soviet Union) anymore and turned to be in the Unipolar. 
Consequently, the globalization occurred from the political climate change and the 
Unipolar from the United States. These conditions can be linked to international trade, 
investment, new actors, and so on, which were affected during the Cold War. Meanwhile, 
there was a vacuum of power in the Southeast Asian region from the United States’ 
military withdrawal and also the rise of China that affected the region directly. The 
economic aspect became the first priority in many countries. It is believed that security 
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issues have received less attention than economic issues. However, when the security 
context is well considered in the post-Cold War era, it becomes a more significant aspect 
and remains a priority as well as the economy for the international community, especially 
in the region. The security and economy are related to each other as complex and 
interdependent. This can be seen from many countries that progress in the collection of 
economic prosperity with the accumulation of military power simultaneously, since 
economic wealth is one of the main factors in the maintenance of military capacities in 
order to secure the national interest and its benefits. Therefore, the relationship between 
security and the economy should be maintained and continued. Moreover, with regard to 
new possible threats as demanding for energy and other natural resources, these 
unresolved disputes, including China’s increasing aggressiveness, may become a 
significant aspect in the future military balance of power in the Southeast Asian region, 
as every country seeks to modernize its military and expand its armed forces in order to 
protect its national interests, and engage other international partners.  
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7. APPENDIX 
The Summary of Conflict in the South China Sea since the 1980s 
YEAR INCIDENTS 
1988 
The Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed at Johnson Reef in the Spratly 
Islands. Several Vietnamese boats were sunk and over 70 sailors killed. 
1992 
Vietnam accused China of landing troops on Da Luc Reef. China seized almost 
20 Vietnamese cargo ships transporting goods from Hong Kong (June – 
September). 
1993 
Malaysia built a resort and accommodation for Malaysian troops and sent 
seventy troops to act as guards over there. Nowadays, it is a resort for the VIPs 
of Malaysia. 
1994 
China and Vietnam had naval confrontations within Vietnam’s internationally 
recognized territorial water over Vietnam’s Tu Chinh oil exploration blocks 
133, 134, and 135. The Chinese claimed the area as part of their Wan’ Bei-21 
(WAB-21) 
1995 
 - China occupied the Philippines’ Mischief Reef. The Philippines’ military 
evicted the Chinese in March and destroyed Chinese markers. 
 - Taiwanese artillery fired on a Vietnamese supply ship. 
1996 
In January, Chinese vessels engaged in a 90-minute gun battle with a 
Philippines navy gunboat near the island of Capones, off the west coast of 
Luzon, north of Manila. 
1997 
The Philippines navy ordered a Chinese speedboat and two fishing boats to 
leave Scarborough Shoal in April. Later, the Philippines navy removed 
markers and raised their flag. China sent three warships to survey the 
Philippines occupied islands of Panata and Kota. 
1998  In January, Vietnamese soldiers fired on a Philippines fishing boat near 
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Tennent (Pigeon) Reef. 
1999 
- Malaysia occupied Navigator Reef, which had been claimed by the 
Philippines.  
-  In May, a Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with a Philippines 
warship. Chinese warships were accused of harassing the Philippines navy 
vessel after it ran aground near the Spratly Islands.  
- In July, another Chinese fishing boat was sunk in a collision with a 
Philippines warship. 
- In October, Vietnamese troops fired upon a Philippines air force plane on 
reconnaissance in the Spratly Islands. The Philippines defense sources reported 
that two Malaysian fighter planes and two Philippines air force surveillance 
planes nearly engaged over a Malaysian occupied reef in the Spratly Islands. 
The Malaysian Defense Ministry stated that it was not a standoff. 
2000 
In May, the Philippines troops opened fire on Chinese fishermen, resulting in 
one killed and seven arrested. 
2001 
- During the first three months, the Philippines navy boarded 14 Chinese 
flagged boats, confiscated their catches, and ejected the vessels out of 
contested portions of the Spratly Islands. 
-  In March, the Philippines sent a gunboat to Scarborough Shoal to ward off 
any attempt by China to erect structures on the rock. 
2002 
- In August, Vietnamese troops fired warning shots at the Philippines military 
reconnaissance planes circling over the Spratly Islands.  
- Vietnam began the renovation of a runway on one of the Spratly Islands 
where there was a conflict over claim over the area. Vietnam blamed that on 
the tourism agenda. 
2007 A Chinese warship ejected Vietnamese fishing boats from the Spratly Islands; 
three Vietnamese fishing boats sank. 250 Vietnamese fishermen protested in 
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front of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi. 
2008 
Vietnam opposed Taiwan in the case of a Taiwanese C 130 airplane 
approaching one of the Spratly Islands. Vietnam claimed this was a violation 
of Vietnamese sovereignty and ordered the cessation of the action. 
2010 
- Hillary Clinton, United States Secretary of the State, blamed China for its 
aggressive military action over the Spratly Islands conflict at the 17th ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, Vietnam. 
- China expressed its disapproval of this through its statement that the United 
States should not interfere with China’s action in the region and only the 
countries involved should resolve the Spratly Islands conflict. Later, China set 
up a military exercise around the Spratly Islands. 
2011 
- In February, a Chinese warship opened fire on Philippines fishing boats near 
Jackson atoll where the Philippines laid claim over the area. 
- In March, two Chinese warships intimidated a Philippines oil survey vessel. 
Later, the Philippines issued a serious statement about the Chinese action, 
saying that China had destroyed the peace and stability in the region. The 
Philippines protested from February to May. However, during that time, a 
Chinese warship opened fire on a Philippines fishing boat and threatened an oil 
survey vessel. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines stated the 
Chinese were in violation of Philippines sovereignty. Later, the Chinese 
ambassador for the Philippines refused to make excuses. China stressed that 
China needed peace and would use the military for self-defense.  
- In June, the Philippines officially announced that the South China Sea had 
become the West Philippines Sea. 
- Vietnam blamed Chinese warships and fishing boats for damaging the Petro 
Vietnam oil company’s cable for surveying. Later, there were protests in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam set up a military exercise with real armaments 
and changed the South China Sea to the East Sea. 
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- China claimed that the Spratly Islands were under China’s sovereignty. Then 
all Chinese fishing boats around the area tried to protect themselves from being 
chased by the Vietnamese navy and blamed Vietnam for violating their 
sovereignty. So China begged Vietnam to stop its action.   
2013 
In May, the Philippines’ coastguard shot and killed a Taiwanese fisherman in 
the disputed and overlapping water near the northern Batanes Islands, which 
the Philippines stated were in Philippines’ water. This incident caused 
escalating tension in the aftermath. Following the rejection of the Philippines’ 
late apology, Taiwan launched two waves of sanctions, both diplomatic and 
economic, on the Philippines. For instance, Taiwan stopped approving work 
permits for Filipinos, banned Taiwanese tourists from visiting the Philippines, 
and sent warships to the disputed area to conduct naval drills. The United 
States, which is the close allies of both countries, tried to cool down the 
tension. In late May, China sent its largest recorded fishing fleet, which 
included two large transport and supply ships, to the disputed Spratly Islands 
area. 
 
Sources: Applied from (Jazes, 2008; Valencia, 2010; BBC News, 2011; Trajano, 2013; 
MaritimeSecurity.Asia, 2013)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
